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I. INTRODUCTION
When the pendulum swings, it swings too far. The Enron debacle-both ending
and beginning with bankruptcy in December 2001, and a perfect storm in
governance terms-was the first to nudge the pendulum. WorldCom's bankruptcy
resulted in losses for millions of investors and caused the pendulum's swing to
gather speed. By all accounts, the July 30, 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation1
pushed the pendulum past the centerline; how far being the principal disagreement.
Adelphia Communications, Tyco, HealthSouth, Global Crossing, Marsh &
McLennan, Hollinger International, and other govemance imbroglios have pushed
the pendulum further.2
The pundits, law professors, governance advocates, commercial providers, and
other reformers continue to write, unaware that this reform is breaking real-world
backs. These reformers' unstated assumption is that, in corporate governance, more
is always better: more board meetings, more audit committee meetings, longer
meetings, longer meetings still, more certifications, more internal controls, new,
often untried documentation of those controls, added auditing devices, beefed up
gatekeepers, new gatekeepers, and separate counsel for independent directors. The
list goes on, with few questions asked about the marginal utility of all these
reforms. The pendulum may have been pushed all the way, fully against the stops.
This Article's purpose is threefold. First, this Article gives insight into the costs
of, but does not detail, the legislatively mandated corporate governance reforms.
3
Second, this Article surveys the reforms which policy makers would have layered
upon the reforms dictated by Sarbanes-Oxley. No one has attempted a snapshot, let
alone a comprehensive picture, of the cumulative toll posed by all of this corporate
governance reform. Third, the Article makes suggestions that may have the effect
of pulling the pendulum toward the center line.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 758 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2004)). The official popular name is the
Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of2002. Popular appellations include
SOA and SOXA, as well as SOX.
2. Cf. William M. Bulkeley & Charles Forelle, How Corporate Scandals Gave Tech Firms aNew
Business Line, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2005, at A l (describing the technology boom that has resulted from
the need for help with complex SOX regulations and the fear of legal consequences associated with not
taking proper precautions: "A new gusher of technology sales is emerging from a surprising source:
laws meant to fight corporate fraud," and "'Sarbanes-Oxley changed the world."').
3. For detailed summaries of SOX, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn:
Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915 (2003) [hereinafter
Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn]; Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002) [hereinafter
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses]; Brian Kim, Recent Developments, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235 (2003). For shorter summaries of SOX, see Mike Allen, Bush Signs
Corporate Reforms Into Law: President Says Era of 'False Profits 'Is Over, WASH. POST, July 31,2002,
at A4; Auditing Sarbanes-Oxley: A Price Worth Paying?, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, at 71.
[Vol. 58: 65
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A number of entities and individuals watch over the modem corporation and
its performance. In modem parlance, those who earn their livelihood doing so are
"monitors." The corporate governance "monitoring model" focuses on the board of
directors, the subgroup of independent directors, and the committees of the board,
most particularly the audit, nominating, and compensation committees.4 With little
effort, one can total up, aside from public and private investors, no less than twelve
to thirteen watchdogs or monitors of corporate performance:
* Board of directors
0 Independent directors
* Committees of the board, including the audit committee
* Debt rating agencies
* Accounting firms
* Lawyers and law firms
* Securities brokers ("registered representatives") and analysts
" Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
* New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or NASDAQ (self regulatory
agencies)
* Specialized government agencies (for example, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and state Public Utility Commissions
(PUCs)
* Financial press (television, magazines, and newspapers)
* Whistleblowers, real and ersatz5
Modem corporations cannot continue their existence as publicly held firms
without the certification or approval of certain of these monitors, such as the board,
the independent directors, the audit committee, a public accounting firm, a multi-
service law firm, the SEC, and perhaps a specialized agency or two at both the
federal and state levels. Those monitors whose certification is essential are
"gatekeepers," "reputational intermediaries who provide verification and
certification services to investors"6 and corporations.7 Without gatekeepers, the
corporation ceases to move forward.
Certain entities serve as mere monitors to some corporations, but are
gatekeepers vis-a-vis other companies. Thus, debt rating agencies may be monitors
4. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 5.01-5.08 (1983 & Supp. 2001)
(exploring the structure of the corporate governance monitoring model).
5. See Douglas M. Branson, Enron- When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap
to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989, 996 (2003) [hereinafter Branson, When All
Systems Fail] (identifying and discussing the multitude of corporate performance monitors).
6. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's A bout the Gatekeepers, Stupid, "57 Bus. LAW.
1403, 1405 (2002).
7. John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308 (2004) [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform].
20061
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with regard to certain issuers of bonds who regard their debt's rating as interesting
but not essential. The same agencies may be gatekeepers for other issuers, like
Enron, for whom a high rating is essential for continued access to markets. Some
commentators eschew the terminology as having "no analytical utility or legal
significance."'8 Nonetheless, in the post-Enron era, the gatekeeper terminology has
become ubiquitous.'
Darwin's "survival of the fittest" seems to apply to gatekeepers' evolution and
the roles they play in corporate governance. Over the years, certain gatekeepers'
influence ebbs while others' increases. As law morphed from a profession to a
business, the attorney's role lessened from that of a deal guru and wise counselor
to that of a technician who could be replaced by several others, many of whom
might perform the task more cheaply. Public accounting, once universally regarded
as a repository of integrity and probity, became a commodity offered at prices
which met or undercut those of competitors. By contrast, the financial press,
arguably more of a monitor than a gatekeeper, gathered strength. Seemingly, each
corporate earnings report has become the source of a news story, while twenty or
thirty years ago, earnings reports were simply numbers reported in the back pages
of newspapers.
One widely used approach is to view SOX as an attempt by Congress to reverse
this Darwinian slide, bolstering up certain gatekeepers. The statute takes "off the
shelf' many, sometimes conflicting, structural devices that may help restore
gatekeepers to their rightful positions.1" Other provisions put gatekeepers in
positions that they have never occupied. Overall, a principal SOX focus is on
"gatekeeper accountability."' 1
8. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance
Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REv. 413, 417 n.6 (2004).
9. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 7, at 308.
10. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn, supra note 3, at 918 ("[T]he Sarbanes Oxley Act
reenacts in a new federal guise more than a dozen existing federal regulations, state laws, stock
exchange and securities industry rules .... ") (footnote omitted); Robert Charles Clark, Corporate
Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too
(Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 525, 2005), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin center/papers/pdf/Clark 525.pdf("These particular reform
ideas [taken off the shelf, so to speak] were around long enough to have stimulated some empirical
studies that cast doubt on their validity .... ").
11. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using the
Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DuKE L.J. 517, 519-520 (2003)
("Congress sought, through Sarbanes-Oxley, to improve corporate decisionnaking indirectly by
imposing new obligations-including standards of conduct, regulation of conflicts, and disclosure
obligations--on outside professionals .. ") (footnotes omitted); see John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud,
and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 57, 59-60 (2005)
(arguing that future prevention of Enron-style disasters depends on five sets of gatekeepers:
"independent auditors, corporate boards of directors, private securities analysts, . . . securities
regulators . . . [, and] criminal prosecutors .... ).
[Vol. 58:65
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B. A Selected SOX Reform or Two
Business and law articles and even entire treatises have devoted considerable
attention to what SOX provides, criticisms of it, recommendations of how to
implement it, and directions on the installation of structures and devices which,
while not required by SOX, support its implementation. 2 This Article merely
recounts one controversial "reform" measure SOX mandates so as to give flavor to
and create context for the main subject: "Beyond SOX," "SOX Plus," and "Just
how much might all of this cost?"
SOX section 404(a) requires that senior executives of public companies attest
to the efficacy of internal accounting controls. 3 Senior executives must also ensure
that public accountants supply a similar attestation.14 Managers and accountants
must do so in the lengthy, gray annual report public companies file each year on
SEC Form 10K.'5
Section 404 also requires that firms file periodic reports with the SEC on an
"accelerated" basis. Firms must file I OKs within two, rather than three, months after
their fiscal year closes.' 6 Firms must eventually file quarterly reports, which remain
unaudited, within thirty-five days after a quarter closes.' 7 These more mundane
SOX features gave birth to the nomenclature, "accelerated filers," which has come
to loom large in the section 404 attestation rule context.
Soon after SOX, large teams of expensive accountants descended upon large
publicly held corporations. These accountants examined each and every accounting
control, or the deficiency or absence of controls. They required installation of new
controls and documentation of each and every control.
Some of these exercises proved beneficial. Internal controls are devices that
cause managers to "squeeze the numbers" as they ascend up through the corporate
organization, eventually contributing to the numbers the corporation publishes on
its financial statements. For example, internal controls require that at each and
everyjuncture, managers certify revenues, costs, and other accounting numbers-in
a work center, at a plant, within a division, on up to a subsidiary, and on to the
parent corporation's income statement and balance sheet-as those numbers
percolate up through an organization. With adequate controls, senior managers have
increased assurances that the final numbers reported reflect economic reality.
12. For discussions regarding various aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley's impact, see Ribstein, Market
vs. Regulatory Responses, supra note 3, at 1; Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road To Nirvana, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REv. 274 (2004); Marc 1. Steinberg, Lawyer Liability after Sarbanes-Oxley-Has the
Landscape Changed?, 3 Wyo. L. REv. 371 (2003).
13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. IV 2004).
14. Id § 404(b).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78o(d) (2000).
16. Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Dates, Securities Act Release No. 8128, Exchange Act
Release No. 46,464, 78 SEC Docket 1139 (Sept. 5, 2002).
17. Rachel McTague, Again, SEC Votes Unanimously to Give Smaller Companies § 404 Relief
37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1611, 1612 (Sept. 26, 2005) [hereinafter McTague, Give
Smaller Companies § 404 RelieA.
2006]
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Much of this reform has proven to be trivial:
Examples of remedial actions pressed upon companies by auditors
in connection with 404 reviews include the following: having the
technical support "help desk" document every call it receives
from employees; requiring employees to respond to thousands of
emails to prove they received them; proving that all of the
physical keys to an office in Europe have been accounted for
since it opened in 1995; and requiring an auditor to attend a
meeting to prove that it took place. More generally, since these
selected examples have a tendentious flavor, the section 404
attestation requirement is costly because it has pressed companies
to document control processes much more fully and elaborately;
to define and enforce restrictions on access to information
technology systems; to separate accounting and financial
functions more fully, even in smaller offices .... 18
A large portion of the expense stems from section 404 requirements that
corporations prove the negative, or demonstrate a higher certainty that their
numbers are accurate. 19
An unintended consequence at accounting firms is that many capable
accountants, rather than be dragooned in section 404 compliance work, which often
has to be performed on the road and away from home for days at a time, are leaving
public accounting.2"
SOX also put into law restrictions the SEC adopted in 2000 in the form of
regulations.2 ' Public accounting firms may no longer perform nine categories of
"consulting services" ranging from in-house accounting and human resources to
18. Clark, supra note 10, at 30 (footnotes omitted) (paraphrasing ALEX DAVERN ET AL., AM. ELEC.
Ass'N, SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404: THE 'SECTION' OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND ITS
IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESS 2 (2005), http://www.aeanet.org/governmentalaffairs/
AeASOXPaperFinal021005.asp); see also David Henry, Honesty Is a Pricey Policy, Bus. WK, Oct. 27,
2003, at 100 ("[M]anufacturers will have to prove that they can trace their products from assembly line
to customer. Temp agencies will have to show that the hours they bill match those worked by their
employees.").
19. See Bulkeley & Forelle, supra note 2, which explains how "the process can still be ripe for
manipulation":
Employees can make false entries in the database, modify the dates of transactions
or generate unauthorized expenditures.
Sarbanes-Oxley aims to curb these abuses. . . . Companies need to
demonstrate to auditors, for instance, that their programs are configured to reject
bogus entries after the close of a quarter, or that they have a security system in
place that would stop a rogue employee from writing himself a giant check.
20. Interview with a departing Ernst & Young partner in Pittsburgh, Pa. (Oct. 8, 2005).
21. These are the so-called Leavitt reforms mandating separation of auditing and consulting,
which are based upon the recommendations of an American Bar Association Blue Ribbon Committee
on audit committee reform. See 64 Fed. Reg. 73,389 (Dec. 30, 1999) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.2-01 (c)(4)(i)-(ix) (2006)).
[Vol. 58: 65
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mergers and acquisitions, actuarial work, and fairness opinions, at least for clients
whose financial statements the accounting firm audits. 22 For firms, auditing may no
longer be offered as a loss leader, but must stand on its own. Section 404 attestation
work, and the auditing and documentation that accompanies it, have surpassed
consulting as profit centers.
The SEC originally estimated that section 404 attestation would cost $91,000
per corporation. 23 At the outset of the exercise, "[t]he SEC estimated that companies
[overall] will pay some $2 billion a year to comply with Section 404. ''24 At nearly
the same time, 217 companies with average revenues of $5 billion estimated that
the new procedure would add $3.14 million per company to compliance costs.2 The
same companies reported average costs of $4.36 million for "year-one Sarbanes-
Oxley section 404 compliance," almost 40% more than their estimates. 26 Mid-cap
companies reported a 66% rise in external costs for consulting, software, and the
like, and a 58% rise in public accountants' fees. 27 The number of personnel hours
for section 404 compliance averaged 26,758.7 people hours.28 Autodesk, a
California-based software company whose capitalization is $8.29 billion, reported
spending $6 million and expending 28,000 personnel hours in the first year of
section 404 attestation. 29 The aggregate cost section 404 imposes has been
estimated at $35 billion per year.30
In subsequent years, corporations will presumably have lower compliance costs
to obtain the needed section 404 attestations.3 1 Lower costs have not stopped the
22. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 201(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. IV 2004) (detailing
requirements for "independence," which still permit firms to undertake comfort letter writing in
securities offerings and tax work). Of the $52 million Arthur Andersen billed Enron in 2000, $25
million represented auditing work while the rest represented consulting services. Branson, When All
Systems Fail, supra note 5, at 1010.
23. Management's Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, Securities Act Release
No. 8238, Exchange Act Release No. 26,068, 80 SEC Docket 1014 (June 5, 2003).
24. Joyce E. Cutler, Firms Note Frustration with Sarbanes-Oxley, Seek 'Rational' Inspection of
Costs, Benefits, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 333, 333 (Feb. 21, 2005).
25. Rachel McTague, FE1 Finds Actual Costs of Compliance with SOX Section 404 Exceed





29. Cutler, supra note 24, at 333. The large national law firm, Foley & Lardner, reported that
SOX increased corporations' governance legal costs by 91%. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, THE COST OF
BEING PUBLIC IN THE ERA OF SARBANES-OXLEY (2005), available at http://www.fei.org. Market
capitalizations came from Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
30. Clark, supra note 10, at 28.
31. See, e.g., Kara Scannell & David Reilly, SmallFirms "Sarbanes Suffering?, WALL ST. J., Apr.
6, 2006, at CI (discussing one study of 238 large and small corporations that showed a 13% drop in
section 404 auditor fees in the second year of compliance); Rachel McTague, SEC, PCAOBRoundtable
on SOX 404: Year Two Better but More Guidance Needed, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at
863, 863 (May 15, 2006) (discussing another study that found that section 404 attestation "costs
declined an average of between 15 and 25 percent in year two," with 400 of 3,000 reporting
corporations finding "material weaknesses" in internal accounting controls).
2006]
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proliferation of SOX consulting firms and products. Two of Forbes's top fourteen
small cap stock picks for 2006, Corporate Executive Board, Inc. and Resources
Connection, Inc., are SOX consulting firms.32 Large consulting firms such as IBM
or Accenture and Bearing Point, the latter two consulting firms spun off from Big
4 (formerly Big 5) accounting firms, as well as smaller entities such as Mercer
Delta Consulting, Hyperion Solutions, Inc., Movaris, and Shareholder.com,
aggressively market SOX services, including section 404 attestations. 3  All the
software firms have SOX products as well, ranging from the large (Oracle and
Microsoft) to the small (LRN Corp. of Los Angeles, California, and Paisley
Consulting of Cokato, Minnesota).34 Projections are that corporations will spend
$7.5 billion per year on SOX software.35
Finally, with a stroke that will hold the line on corporations' costs, a Federal
District Judge held that, in enacting SOX, Congress had no intention of creating a
private right of action for investors allegedly aggrieved by violations of SOX.3 6 The
holding is a death knell to class actions for damages in cases of SOX violations by
corporations. At least corporations presently do not have to worry about liability to
investors.
C. Praise and Criticism for SOX
Evidently believing that the SEC has been taking names, public company
officials have either timidly criticized or faintly praised SOX, at least in their public
pronouncements. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a small-cap manufacturer
of industrial products says that SOX requires "a lot more documentation," "mak[es]
it harder to recruit board members," and "is especially burdensome for smaller-cap
firms."37 The Enron restructuring officer reports that SOX provides "a 'very
32. Fourteen Favorites, FORBES, Oct. 31,2005, at 171, 174. As of Sept. 16,2006, the corporations
had market capitalizations of $3.59 billion and $1.19 billion, respectively. Yahoo! Finance,
http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
33. See Carol Hymowitz, Experiments in Corporate Governance, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2005, at
R2; Peter Loftus, Software for Sarbanes, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2005, at R8; see, e.g., Kris Maher,
Sarbanes-Oxley Is Boon for Slew of Consultants, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2003, at B 1 (featuring
Ehticspoint, Inc., Listen Up Group, and other whistleblower hotline consultants); Phyllis Plitch, A Piece
of the Action: Corporate Governance Is Hot-And There 's No Shortage of Companies Promising to
Help, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R8 (featuring Movaris, Restricted Stock Systems, PeopleSoft, and
Shareholder.com).
34. See Loftus, supra note 33, at R8 (reviewing the products and services of IBM, Browne & Co.,
EMC Corp., Steelent, Inc., Global Compliance Services, and Resources Connection, Inc., as well as the
other companies already mentioned).
35. Bulkeley & Forelle, supra note 2 (describing SOX software by Consul Risk Management,
Inc., EMC Corp., RSA Security, Inc., Computer Associates International, Virsa Systems, Inc.,
Orchestria, Inc., Lumigent Technologies, Inc., and Serena Software, Inc.).
36. Neer v. Perlino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Robert F. Serio & Matthew S.
Kahn, Private Rights ofAction andthe Sarbanes-OxleyAct of2002, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
16, at 668 (Apr. 17, 2006).
37. Judith Bums, Is Sarbanes-Oxley Working?, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2004, at R8 (reporting
remarks of Janet Dolan, President and Chief Executive Officer, Tennant Co.).
[Vol. 58: 65
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helpful' blueprint for reform."38 The representative of Ohio Public Employees
Retirement System, a large institutional investor, thinks that SOX is "'a step in the
right direction."' 39 A general counsel believes there is "a lot more right than
wrong,"40 and a corporate governance watchdog says she would not "make any
'substantive changes."' 4 The chief accounting officer of a well known large-cap
corporation opines that "'Sarbanes-Oxley is working pretty well."' 42
The more outspoken of SOX's sponsors, Representative Michael G. Oxley of
Ohio, weighed in with the House Financial Services Committee comments that
SOX's costs are "unsubstantial."43 In a speech at the World Bank on September 16,
2003, Representative Oxley pointed out that "retail investors came back to the
markets after nearly two years of scandal and plummeting fortunes .... '[W]e had
a small part in restoring that investor confidence."'" Former Chairman of the SEC,
William Donaldson, touted SOX as a "'valuable government intervention,"' one
which "helped to improve the 'tone at the top' of U.S. public companies."45
NASDAQ's president, Bob Greifeld, joined the chorus, stating that "[u]nlike some
others on Wall Street, I support Sarbanes-Oxley. It's a good thing.... [S]erious
legislation that [strikes] a sensible compromise. 4 6 The god-like Alan Greenspan,
former Federal Reserve Chairman, found SOX to be proving surprisingly effective,
revealing that he had been "an early and passionate advocate in internal
deliberations of using laws and regulations to make chief executives more
accountable."4 7
On the private side, a large public accounting firm took out a full-page
advertisement in a national newspaper, stating that "to see the real impact of
38. Id. (reporting remarks of Stephen Cooper, Chairman, Kroll Solfo Cooper, LLC, New York,
and interim Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer of Enron Corp.).
39. Id. (reporting remarks of Cynthia Richson, Corporate Governance Officer for Ohio Public
Employees Retirement Systsem).
40. Id. (reporting remarks of Logan Robinson, Vice President and General Counsel, Delphi Corp.,
Troy, Mich.).
41. Id (reporting remarks of Nell Minnow, Editor of the Corporate Library, Portland, Maine).
42. Id. (reporting remarks of Arnie Hanish, Chief Accounting Officer, Eli Lilly & Co.,
Indianapolis, Ind.).
43. Rachel McTague, House Panel Argues Compliance Costs of Sarbanes-Oxley Are Not
Substantial, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1289 (Aug. 4, 2003).
44. Richard Hill, Oxley Says Returning Investors Signal Renewed Market Confidence, Success
of Law, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1550 (Sept. 19, 2003).
45. Donaldson Cites Sarbanes-Oxley Act as 'Valuable Government' lntervention, 36 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1969 (Nov. 8, 2004).
46. Bob Greifeld, Op-Ed., The View from Nasdaq, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2004, at A10.
47. David Wessel, Corporate Overhauls Are Proving to Be Effective, Greenspan Says, WALL ST.
J., May 16, 2005, at C3. For similar remarks by Paul Volcker, Federal Reserve Chairman from 1979 to
1987, and Arthur Levitt, Jr., SEC chairman from 1993 to 2001, see Paul Volcker & Arthur Levitt, Jr.,
Op-Ed. In Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2004, at A16 ("We believe the benefits
of the legislation outweigh the costs.").
2006]
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404-improved investor confidence evidenced by a better capital allocation
process-will take more than a few months. 48
For the most part, commentators have been scornful in their criticism of SOX.
49
In an op-ed piece, one leading scholar questioned "strict enforcement of Sarbanes-
Oxley in spite of mounting evidence that it is costly beyond any conceivable
benefits."5 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce president, Thomas Donohue, strident
in his criticism of SOX, calls the costs of section 404 "unjustified" and labels the
SEC as "overreaching" in its administration of the statute." In an earlier
pronouncement, he expressed that SOX produces a "risk averse economy," "puts
too much of a burden on executives and officers to be perfect," and "create[s]
,,52enormous uncertainty.
On its editorial page, the Wall Street Journal has been both profuse and
colorful in its criticism of SOX. Bemoaning the cost of section 404 compliance, one
editorial notes that Sarbanes-Oxley "did achieve one miracle. The accounting
profession, reviled as the moral equivalent of porn merchants just two years ago,
has been lofted to unexpected new heights of power and prosperity."53 The editorial
also reports that "audit fees, for the average company, have rise about 50% in a
single year."54 In addition, Fortune 100 corporations will pay an estimated $6
billion to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley in 2006.55 Among the S&P 500, the average
fees individual firms paid for auditing rose from $2.9 million in 2001 to $7.4
million in 2004.56
Other critics remain out of sight, or are lukewarm in their denunciations.
Overall, among the public pronouncements, praise outweighs the criticism.
48. Advertisement, The Glass Is Half Full, But That's Debatable, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2005, at
A5.
49. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (analyzing empirical literature suggesting that post-Enron
government mandates are not likely to improve audit quality or enhance firm performance); David B.
Kahn, Let's Get Real-Why the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Is a Sham 1 (2002), http://kahnlawchicago.com
("[T]he Sarbanes-Oxley Act will do little to prevent the false and inflated reports on the financial
condition of our public companies.").
50. Henry Manne, Op-Ed., Life After Donaldson, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2005, at A10.
51. Brett Ferguson, Chamber Raps Regulator Excessiveness in Overseeing Governance, Cites
SEC, Spitzer, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 52 (Jan. 10, 2005).
52. Richard Hill, U.S. Chamber Head Says Sarbanes-Oxley Will Hinder Progress of Business
Innovation, 34 Sec. Law Daily 37 (BNA) (Sept. 19, 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Op-Ed., Thinking Outside the Sarbox, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2004,
at A13.
54. Id.; see also David Henry, Bean Counter Bonanza, BUS. WK., Oct. 27, 2003, at 101
(predicting that the Big Four accounting firms would take in 50% to 100% more in fees in 2004).
55. David Reilly, Sarbanes-Oxley Changes Take Root, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2006, at C3.
56. Deborah Solomon, At What Price?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R3.
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D. Calls for SOXII
Commentators have called outright for amendments to section 404, such as
deleting the requirement for accountants' attestations for small-cap and some mid-
cap corporations." For these companies, section 404 tends to be regressive. 8 These
corporations must pay out a large portion of the $2 million or $3 million required
in auditing fees each year from a much smaller revenue base.59 Even before SOX,
many of these companies teetered on the brink of profitability because their
products are often unestablished or experimental.
Indeed, the cost of compliance may be much higher for many smaller
corporations. For years, large companies have had in place internal accounting staff
who, as a principal task, evaluated, implemented, and documented the types of
internal controls SOX requires. In contrast, internal accounting functions barely
exist at smaller companies, if they exist at all. For practical purposes, with section
404 exercises, most small-cap companies start from scratch, writing on a clean
slate. Thus, on a relative basis, their costs are much higher.
The one-size-fits-all mindset also persists, forcing smaller companies to do, or
feel that they must undertake, the same SOX tasks as larger companies, such as the
installation and verification of internal controls. In addressing the European
Parliamentary Financial Securities Forum, SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins blamed
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), whose thick, gray
Auditing Standard Number 2, notable for "sheer length and tone[,] . . . ha[s]
contributed to an excess of caution and an emphasis on needless detail."6
Commissioner Cynthia Glassman is more colorful: "[A] company having 40,000
key [internal] controls is an oxymoron: 'How can they all be key?"' 6 An estimate
is that to comply with SOX, small-cap public companies pay an average of eleven
times what their larger cap brethren must pay.62
57. See, e.g., Andrew Skouvakis, Comment, Exiting the Public Markets: A Difficult Choice for
Small Public Companies Struggling with Sarbanes-Oxley, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 1279, 1280 (2005)
(stating that Congress or the SEC should provide relief for small public companies burdened by the
fixed costs of implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Nathan Wilda, Comment, David Pays for
Goliath's Mistakes: The Costly Effect Sarbanes-Oxley Has on Small Companies, 38 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 671, 692 (2005) ("[A]n... exemption for small companies.., would provide a balance between
the protection of investors and the need to avoid overburdening small companies.").
58. Clark, supra note 10, at 29.
59. See id.
60. Atkins Calls for SEC Review of PCA OB Internal-Controls Standard, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 44, at 1867 (Nov. 7,2005) (calling for SEC oversight of PCAOB standards and guidelines).
61. Kip Betz, Glassman Says 404 RulesAimedat Holding ManagementAccountable, 37 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No.41, at 1738 (Oct. 17,2005) ("[l]ntemal controls reporting rules under section 404
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have turned off course and must be refocused on their original intent .... ).
Citing the "one-size-fits-all" effect, the SEC Advisory Committee recommended, with one dissension,
that regulations exempt small-cap companies from the requirement for external assessments of internal
controls. Alison Carpenter, SEC Advisory Group on Small Companies Backs Looser Section 404
Reporting Rules, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2113 (Dec. 19, 2005).
62. Bob Greifeld, Op-Ed., It's Time to Pull Up Our SOX, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2006, at A14.
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Foreign issuers seeking to have their shares listed on the NYSE or traded on
NASDAQ had been one growing category of small-cap companies. As an example,
Professor Jack Coffee points to the number of Israeli high tech firms that sought
U.S. listings in 1999 and before. 63 He has predicted a continued migration of
listings to the U.S., which saw 750 foreign listings in 2000 compared to 170 in
1990 as firms sought to associate with stricter corporate governance regimes.64
Post SOX, much of the discussion concerning foreign companies' withdrawal
from U.S. markets has been either solely rhetoric or a combination of rhetoric with
anecdotes. An editorial asserts "concern about the number of European and Asian
companies delisting from, or not listing on, U.S. exchanges-to say nothing of a
drastic decline in domestic IPOs. '65 Mexican Firms Leave NYSE profiles the
departures of conglomerate Desc SA and steel manufacturer Groupo Imsa SA butcontains no statistics. 6 Foreign businesses are not listing in the U.S. for other
reasons over and above the costs of SOX compliance. For example, capital markets
in home countries tend to be much deeper and more liquid than they once were.
With computerized trading mechanisms such as E*TRADE and Charles Schwab,
U.S. investors find it much easier to access those foreign markets.6" Large European
companies, such as VNU, Roche, and Adidas-Salomon, think a U.S. listing is
"expensive and... a lot of extra work. ' 69 For corporations on or close to the fence,
the SOX compliance cost has been a tipping point against a U.S. listing.
The statistics demonstrate that voluntary delistings by foreign corporations are
not as frequent as SOX critics predicted. The NASDAQ had at least ten voluntary
foreign company delistings in 2004.70 The NYSE had two in 2003 and two in
2 0 0 4 .7i Delisting is difficult because the foreign firn must demonstrate that the
number of U.S. shareholders has fallen below 300.72 But in December 2005, the
SEC adopted new rule 12h-6 which makes it easier for foreign firms that are in
good standing to terminate their registrations.73
63. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance andIts Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641,675 (1999) (noting that more than
100 Israeli firms, of which 70 are high tech, are listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX).
64. See John C. Coffee, Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1757, 1770-72
(2002) (noting that in 2002, nearly 17% of firms with NYSE listings were foreign).
65. Manne, supra note 50.
66. Amy Guthrie, Mexican Firms Leave NYSE, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2005, at C 14.
67. Id.
68. See Craig Karmin, Listing in the U.S.-Some Can 't Be Bothered, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21,2003,
at C1 ("[B]uying foreign shares is much easier than it was a few years ago.").
69. Id. (noting that listing in U.S. is "more cumbersome and confusing than ever").
70. Silvia Ascarelli, Citing Sarbanes, Foreign Companies Flee U.S. Exchanges, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 2004, at C I Fig. (chart generated by NYSE and Wall Street Journal research that displays the
number of voluntary delisting by non-U.S. companies from 1996 to 2004).
71. Id.
72. David Epstein, Goodbye, Farewell Auf Wiedersehen, Adieu..., WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2005,
at A10.
73. Rachel McTague, SEC Unanimously Proposes Relaxation of Deregistration for Foreign
Private Issuers, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2085 (Dec. 19, 2005).
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Instead, even though the number of deregistrations of foreign firms has slowed,
the number of foreign corporations seeking U.S. listings has gone from a robust
stream to a mere trickle.74 From peaks of 63 in 1997 and 60 in 2000, the number of
foreign firms seeking a NYSE listing slowed to 16 in 2003, 8 in 2004, and 13 in
2005. 7' Experts and firms themselves cite SOX compliance as the culprit.
Besides calls for amendment or repeal of section 404, at least for small-cap
companies, well-respected commentators have called for and outlined SOX repeal
or accommodations for foreign corporations.76
E. The SEC Response: Delayed Implementation
In the eyes of some, the SEC response has been lukewarm. At first, the SEC
took a tough stance, noting "'that improved corporate governance, improved
financial reporting, [and] improved auditor performance is important for all
companies, regardless of size.' 77 Thus, large public corporations were required to
file section 404 attestations on the SEC annual report form 10K for fiscal years
ending on or after June 15, 2004.78 Smaller corporations would have to do so for
fiscal years ending on or after April 15, 2005. 79
The SEC soon began to take a more middle-of-the-road, accommodating
stance. The SEC delayed section 404 filings for "companies with [a] market
74. See Craig Karmin & Aaron Lucchetti, New York Loses Edge in Snagging Foreign Listings,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2006, at C1. In 2000, foreign corporations raised $9 of every $10 raised in New
York rather than in London or Luxembourg, the closet competitors. Id. In 2005, after Sarbanes-Oxley
had taken hold, the statistic was exactly the opposite: foreign corporations raised $9 of every $10 in
London or Luxembourg. Id. In 2000, foreign firms raised 46.8% of capital on U.S. exchanges; in 2005,
the number had fallen to 5.7%. Regulatory, Litigation Costs Seen Causing Loss of U.S. Listings, 38 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 750. Furthermore, "in 2005, only one of the world's top 24 IPOs
registered in the United States." Id.
75. Ascarelli, supra note 70 (citing a chart generated by Wall Street Journal research that displays
number of foreign firms seeking a NYSE listing from 2001-2004); see also Karmin & Lucchetti, supra
note 74 (providing the 2005 statistic).
76. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to
Regulate Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. REv. 849, 886 (2004) (explaining the consequences
of a unilateralist policy that forces foreign issuers to rise to U.S. standards and the benefits of an
international approach to business regulation) (Professor Karmel is a former commissioner of the SEC);
Larry E. Ribstein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the Rent on US Law, 3 J.
CORP. L. STUD. 299 (2003) (explaining that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes requirements on foreign
firms that often conflict with the law of the firms' home countries); Corinne A. Falencki, Note,
Sarbanes-Oxley: Ignoring the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
1211, 1236-38 (2004) (recommending that the SEC work towards regulating businesses on a global
scale to promote harmony in the global market).
77. Richard Hill, Beller Says SEC Prepared to Ease Burden of SOX Compliance on Small Firms,
36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1706 (Sept. 27, 2004) (quoting Alan Belier, Director of the
SEC Division of Corporate Finance).
78. Large Companies Expect to Spend Millions to Meet SOXA Internal Controls Requirements,
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capitalization of up to $75 million until [fiscal years ending after] July 2007. ' '80 The
SEC also delayed implementation for foreign corporations. 8' Further, SEC
Chairman Donaldson publicized an SEC website the Commission had created so
that "all interested parties can send us feedback on their experiences with Section
404. ",82 Nonetheless, the SEC Chairman labeled cries for a partial repeal of SOX to
be "short-sighted."83 The SEC also founded a twenty-one member Advisory
Committee on Smaller Public Companies, which held its first meeting in April
2005.84
In September 2005, the SEC relented further. It announced a three-tiered
regulatory format: "large accelerated filers" with a market capitalization over $700
million, "accelerated filers" with a market capitalization under $700 million, and
"non-accelerated filers" with a market capitalization under $75 million." The latter
category numbers over 6,000 public companies which will not have to comply until
after mid-2007.86 The SEC also exempted the middle category from the accelerated
annual sixty day and quarterly thirty-five day filing deadlines.87
Critics of SEC accounting regulation were quick to speak out, "crying foul"
over delayed implementation and what wags have termed SOX Lite.88 An
accounting professor noted that approximately "75% of companies that were the
subject of fraud allegations described in SEC enforcement releases from 1998 to
2003 had market capitalizations of less than $700 million... ., "'A good internal-
control system within these companies would have prevented a good number of
these,"' stated another accounting professor. 90
Studies flatly contradict the latter. Fraud and accounting imbroglios come to
light because of a tip (42.6%), internal auditing (24.6%), accident (18%), outside
auditors' discovery (16.4%), and last of all, by virtue of an earlier-installed internal
80. Deborah Solomon, Small Firms to Get Another Extension on Sarbanes Rule, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 13, 2005, at A2.
81. William H. Donaldson, Op-Ed., 'We've Been Listening, 'WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2005, at A 14




84. See Kip Betz, Witnesses Ask Panel to Seek Amended SOX Rules for Smaller Firms, 37 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1129 (June 27,2005) (outlining the discussion of prominent business
leaders testifying before the SEC Advisory Committee on smaller public companies).
85. SEC Sets Meeting to Consider Extending Compliance Date for Internal Controls Rules, 37
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1555 (Sept. 19, 2005) ("[T]he SEC said it will consider whether
to propose amendments to the 'accelerated filer' definition in Rule 12b-2 of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act.").
86. McTague, Give Smaller Companies § 404 Relief supra note 17.
87. Id.
88. Micheal Rapoport, Watchdogs Frustrated by Sarbanes Extension, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2005,
at C3.
89. Id. (commenting on the remarks of Joseph Carcello, University of Tennessee professor who
regularly works with the SEC).
90. Id. (quoting Thomas Weirich, an accounting professor at Central Michigan University).
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control (8.2%). 9 1 Because of the costs involved and their desperate attempts to hold
the line on costs, smaller corporations and other smaller issuers are "outsourcing"
section 404 attestation work to India.92
Meanwhile, executives at a number of smaller cap public companies find
themselves unable to obtain an accounting firm to do section 404 attestations at all,
or to do them at a price anywhere near what companies feel they can afford. 93 The
condition is so widespread that it has even taken on a name, "Sarbanes-Oxley
limbo. 94 In Roman Catholic teachings, at least of the old fashioned kind, limbo is
"a region believed to exist on the border of hell as the abode of souls barred from
heaven through no fault of their own (as the souls of ... unbaptized infants)." 95
Corporations' inability to comply at all may well have played a part in the SEC
decision to delay implementation to late 2007 and beyond.
F. Beyond SOX (or SOX and Beyond)
Despite the costs this Article describes, at least in small part, corporate
governance advocates and reformers layer added requirements over what Sarbanes-
Oxley requires. There is a first generation of "best practices" blueprints in corporate
governance. In the United States, they include the General Motors 28 Points96 and
the American Law Institute's (ALl) Principles of Corporate Governance and
Structure.97 Elsewhere in the world, sources include the Cadbury Report in
91. Clark, supra note 10, at 30.
92. Eric Bellman, One More Cost ofSarbanes-Oxley: Outsourcingto India, WALL ST. J., July 14,
2005, at Cl ("An increasing number of companies are looking to India's information-technology
outsourcing firms to cut the cost and time needed to comply with the law ... ").
93. See Give Smaller Companies § 404 Relief supra note 17 (providing a detailed discussion of
the challenges facing smaller companies when complying with SOX section 404 attestation costs).
94. See generally Press Release, S. Comm. on Small Business & Entrepreneurship, Snowe: Small
Businesses Could Face Expensive, Paralyzing Regulatory Limbo Under Sabanes-Oxley Law (Mar. 9,
2006), http://sbc.senate.gov/HTML/news/release4.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2006) ("Currently, many
small public companies are caught in an expensive and paralyzing state of regulatory limbo." (quoting
Letter from Senator Olympia J. Snowe, Chair, Senate Committee on Small Business &
Entrepreneurship, to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC)).
95. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1312 (2002) (providing secondary
definitions that include "a place or state of restraint or confinement... [or] of neglect or oblivion").
96. GEN. MOTORS BD. OF DIR., GM BOARD GUIDELINES ON SIGNIFICANT CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ISSUES (June 1995 ed.) (on file with South Carolina Law Review).
97. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS XXV (1994)
[hereinafter ALl CoRP. Gov. PROi. The ALI effort to "restate," or state for the first time, principles
applicable to corporate governance] proved very controversial. It began in 1980 and lasted until 1993.
Id at XI n.1.
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England,98 the Vid-not and Marini Reports in France, 99 the Bosch Report by the
Institute of Corporate Directors in Australia, 100 and many more.''
In the United States, second generation best practices blueprints include
academics' articles and other pronouncements. '02 Perhaps attempting to mushroom
large engagements into even larger ones, the consulting firms have come up with
lists of governance add-ons. Other consultants, including no less than the venerable
Standards & Poor's Corporation, sell services that audit and grade corporations'
compliance with scores of corporate governance metrics. 103 In the larger corporate
governance debacles, investigative committees of the boards of directors render
98. THE COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1992) (This report is known as the Cadbury
Report after the Committee's Chair, Adrian Cadbury). Cadbury was followed by the Greenbury Report,
STUDY GROUP ON DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION, DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION: REPORT OF A STUDY
GROUP CHAIRED BY SIR RICHARD GREENBURY (1995), and the Hampel Report, THE COMM. ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FINAL REPORT (1998)
(Committee chaired by Ronnie Hampel). They have recently been revised and re-issued as the Turnbull
Guidance. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, INTERNAL CONTROL: REVISED GUIDANCE FOR DIRECTORS
ON THE COMBINED CODE (2005).
99. See James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance, 31
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 31, 57 (1998) ("[B]oth the Vidnot Report and the Marini Report urge French
directors to take their basic duty of care more seriously.").
100. AUSTL. INST. OF CO. DIR. ET AL., CORPORATE PRACTICES AND CONDUCT (2d ed. 1993)
Chaired by Henry Bosch AO) (on file at the National Library of Australia).
101. See, e.g., Valentina Barbanti, The Reform of Corporate Governance in the United States and
the New Challenge of the European Union: The Italian Case, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 227,242
(2003) ("Upon implementation of the Legislative Decree No. 6 of January 17, 2003, the Italian system
of corporate governance will materially change."); Marco Ventoruzzo, Experiments in Comparative
Corporate Law: The Recent Italian Reform and the Dubious Virtues of a Market for Rules in the
Absence of Effective Regulatory Competition, 40 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 113, 115 (2004) ("The Reform
introduced profound changes to the rules contained in Italian Civil Code ... that dwarf... other
corporate law reforms .... ").
102. Academic blueprints include the following: FRED R. KAEN, A BLUEPRINT FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE PRESERVATION OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE
(2003); Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
8 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 127 (2002); Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn, supra note 3; William
W. Bratton & Margaret M. Blair, Restoring Trust in America's Business Institutions (Georgetown Law
and Economics Research Paper No. 784526, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract+784526.
103. See Clark, supra note 10, at 4 ("The rating agencies ... include Institutional Shareholder
Services ('ISS'), the largest and most influential of the active agencies, as well as Governance Metrics
International ('GMI'), the Corporate Library, Moody's, and Standard & Poor's."); see, e.g., Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS) Corporate Governance Quotient, http://www.isscgq.com/
abouttheratings.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2006) (describing the eight core criteria used to calculate a
Corporate Governance Quotient 0); The Corporate Library (TCL): Board Analyst,
http://www.boardanalyst.com/ (last visited Oct. 1,2006) (providing independent corporate governance
analysis through Board Analyst, an online database covering corporate governance, compensation, and
performance metrics (formerly known as Board Effectiveness Ratings)); see also Phyllis Plitch, S & P
Quits Rating Corporate Governance in U.S., WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2005, at C3 (reporting that in
September 2005, Standard & Poor's ceased marketing its corporate governance ratings and services in
the U.S. but plans to continue the ratings and services in emerging markets such as Russia); Clint Riley,
Citigroup 's Corporate Governance Improves, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Mar. 20, 2006, at 21 (mentioning
GMI, TCL, and ISS as premier rating agencies).
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reports and make good-governance recommendations. Two leading reports are the
Powers Report at Enron, prepared by a committee chaired by Dean William Powers
of the University of Texas School of Law,"° and the Wilmer Cutler & Pickering
Report at WorldCom, written under the names of three expansion directors, but
prepared by a leading Washington, D.C. law firm. 0 5 The American Bar Association
rendered a report with its own recommendations via a committee chaired by James
H. Cheek, III.1°6
When bankruptcy follows a governance debacle, bankruptcy examiners also
render lengthy written reports.'17 Neal Batson rendered the reports for Enron.'
Governor Richard Thornburgh, assisted by his law firm, rendered three lengthy
reports in WorldCom's bankruptcy.' 0 9
Last of all, a new player, the "corporate monitor," has come into existence. The
first monitor report, written by former Chairman of the SEC, Richard Breeden,
entitled Restoring Trust, "' provided the beginning framework for this section of the
article. Restoring Trust mandates installation of seventy-eight corporate governance
"improvements" at WorldCom, later known as MCI, Inc., now part of Verizon
Communications, Inc."' Mr. Breeden and his consulting firm have served as
104. SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BD. OF DIR. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION 31 (2002), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/
sicreport/sicreport02102.pdf.
105. SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BD. OF DIR. OF WORLDCOM INC., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION (2003), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/worldcom/
Bdspcomm6093rpt.pdf.
106. ABA TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT (2003); see also ABA TASK
FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, PRELIMINARY REPORT (2003), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
corporateresponsibility/preliminaryreport.pdf.
107. See, e.g., Planet Hollywood Forgave Loans: A Bankruptcy Examiner Says the Restaurant
Company Wrote Off$5-Million in Loans to Celebrities, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 14, 2002, at D3
(discussing independent bankruptcy court examiner's report revealing loans to celebrities); Professor
Named to Probe Case of Revco Drug's LBO, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1990, at A2 (reporting that a
bankruptcy court judge required Barry L. Zaretsky, as examiner in the Revco Drugstores bankruptcy,
to submit a detailed report); Raytheon's Statement on WGJ's Bankruptcy Examiner's Report, PR
NEWSWIRE, Aug. 28, 2001 (discussing the examiners report for WGI's bankruptcy).
108. See First Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, In re Enron Corp., No.
01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2002), available at http://www.enron.com/corp/por/
supporting.htm.; see also Examiner Namedfor Enron, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2002, at C4 (Neal Batson's
appointment as bankruptcy examiner for Enron's Chapter I 1 bankruptcy).
109. See Third and Final Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court Examiner, In Re
WorldCom, Inc., No. 2-15533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 4, 2002).
110. See RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ON CORPORATE
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corporate monitor and rendered reports in several other high profile corporate
governance cases including Fannie Mae, Hollinger International, and KPMG." 2
II. THE REFORMS
The following represents a survey of the "bells and whistles" that have, do, and
may adorn modem corporate governance efforts.
A. Board of Directors
Old
1. Board Meetings. Boards met quarterly, often with one board meeting held as
a "fly away" meeting at a resort or in a more distant city. The corporation may
have permitted spouses to attend the latter. The meeting was often held as a
planning meeting or strategic retreat.
2. Meeting Duration. Meetings lasted three to four hours, often during the
morning and sometimes into the early afternoon.
3. Larger Boards. The group may have consisted of twenty or more directors.'13
With a very large number, a group of inside directors, although less than a
majority, could control the agenda due to collective action problems that
prevented the majority of independent directors from networking amongst
themselves. 114
4. Single Leader. The same individual held, and insisted on holding, both the
positions of CEO and Chairperson. Proponents argued that with separation of
the two offices, two individuals would vie for a single leadership position to
the detriment of the company.' 15
5. Board Composition: Several "Independent"Directors. The corporation would
recruit several directors free from significant financial or familial ties to the
112. See Breeden is Tapped to Help Fannie Mae, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28,2005, at A l ("Fannie Mae
has hired Richard Breeden to assist in its financial restatement and to help shore up corporate
governance."); Geraldine Fabrikant, Investigator and Hollinger Chief Clash Over Paying $850,000,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at C4 ("Richard C. Breeden ... is overseeing a special committee's
investigation into payments made to Lord Black and other top Hollinger executives.") Arshad
Mohammed, "Bulldog" Breeden to Monitor Tax-Fraud Deal, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2005, at DI
(stating that Breeden "was named yesterday to monitor [KPMG's] agreement" with the Justice
Department).
113. See, e.g., RALPH D. WARD, 21 ST CENTURY CORPORATE BOARD 4 (1997) (noting that "[t]he
1965 model GM board had 29 directors," of which 17 were insiders).
114. Cf. Steve Lohr, Rubber Stamp Is Tossed Aside by G.M. Board, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1992,
at A l ("General Motors Corp.... has abandoned its past in placing an outside board member in charge
of a top board committee to monitor more closely G.M.'s management.").
115. See, e.g., Len Boselovic, SplitAbout Splitting; Separating CEO, Chairman 'sJobsIn Vogue,
But Some Aren 't Sure It's Worth It, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTlE, Mar. 16, 2004, at C9 (reporting
statements by Professor Charles Elson that "[u]nless you get the right person, the company could end
up with two leaders, 'which makes it hard to run a company"').
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senior managers. Some companies included social ties as well. 16 The
remainder of directors would include the CEO; another high ranking manager
or two, such as the chief financial officer (CFO), chief operations officer
(COO), or executive vice president; the head of a principal division or
subsidiary; and one or more "gray directors," such as a lawyer or commercial
or investment banker who, while an outsider, derived significant revenues from
the corporation either directly or through her firm." 7
6. Board Committees. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has required that
listed companies have an audit committee since 1977.18 Earlier corporate
statutes authorized, and corporations had, only an executive committee.
Between meetings of the full board, the executive committee, comprised
perhaps of three insiders, was delegated the full board's powers, save for
powers made non-delegable by statute. It was thought to be abuse that an
executive committee could easily usurp the prerogatives and powers of the full
board. Among more elaborate committee structures, finance, capital
investment, and social responsibility committees rounded out the committee
lineup. In more modem times, executive committees have become rarer and the
required lineup includes audit, nominating (often denominated "governance"
or "nominating and governance"), and compensation committees. "
9
New
1. Board Meetings. The full board should meet at least ten times per year. On at
least two of those occasions, the board should meet at a non-headquarters
facility of the company.
2. Duration. Board meetings should last a full day, or even two days.
3. Smaller Boards. Mid-cap company boards average 9.2 directors while S&P
500 company boards average 10.9.12
°
116. The courts have not recognized a mere social tie as negating a director's independence. See,
e.g., Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386,409 (Del. Ch. 1999) (holding that two board
members who "were neighbors or former neighbors is of no moment." (citing In re Grace Energy Corp.
S'holder Litig., No. 12,464,1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 134)); see also 1 ALI CoRP. Gov. PROJ., supra note
97, § 1.23 cmt., at 27 ("It is not intended that a person would be treated as subject to a controlling
influence, and therefore interested, solely because of a long-time friendship or other social
relationship.
117. See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 576 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (finding an attorney at a prestigious law firm to have been an insider for purposes of securities
law due diligence analysis).
118. In re N.Y. Stock Exch., Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, 11 SEC Docket 1945 (Mar. 9,
1977).
119. See ALI CORP. Gov. PROJ., supra note 97, § 3A.02-.05, at 114-27 (discussing audit,
nominating, and compensation committees).
120. Board Basics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R7 (range is from 3 to 31 members).
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4. Board Composition. A majority of all directors should be independent.' 2 ' While
SOX mandates that only audit committee members be independent,' Self
Regulatory Organizations (SROs) such as the NYSE and NASDAQ require that
a majority be independent.'23
5. Executive Sessions. Each board meeting should have time reserved for an
executive session at which no member of management, including the CEO, will
be present.
6. Side Jobs. Experts opine that by acceptance of consulting and similar
arrangements, directors forfeit a portion of their independence.' 24 In the Senate
Hearings on Enron, Professor Charles Elson of the University of Delaware
testified that "directors should 'have no financial connection to the company
whatsoever' other than their board compensation.' ' 125 Elson further testified,
...[Ifa director's role is as a consultant, hire the director as a consultant. If the





At Enron, each and every director received annual consulting fees from the
company in addition to their director compensation.127 The NYSE limits side
job compensation to $100,000 annually 28 while NASDAQ set the limit at
$60,000. 129 Directors who accept more may still serve, but they lose their status
as "independent." Among other things, swing votes by such directors are
ineffective and courts will not count them to determine if a board decision is
entitled to heightened "business judgement rule protection."13°
Proposed
1. Yearly Strategic Planning Sessions. Corporations should have a plenary board
meeting at which directors review all major areas of the corporation's business.
121. See id Overall, 66% of directors on all boards and 72% of directors on S&P 500 boards are
independent. Id. Members' average tenure is 8.4 years, average age is 58.9 years (59.9 years in the S&P
500), and 10% are women. Id.
122. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301(m)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. IV 2004).
123. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.00 (2006).
124. See S. REP. No. 107-70, at 51-53 (2002). Retired Chairman and CEO of Sunoco, Inc., Robert
Campbell, gave similar testimony: "[C]onsulting arrangements with directors [are] absolutely incorrect,
absolutely wrong." Id.
125. Id. at 52.
126. Id. at 53.
127. Enron directors, or their firms, received annual consulting fees of $70,000 to $493,914. Id.
at 51-52. Enron made gifts of $500,000-$600,000 to charities with which directors had close
affiliations, as well as other indirect payments. Id.
128. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.02(b)(ii).
129. NASDAQ, Inc., NASDAQ Corporate Governance Summary of Rule Changes (Nov. 4,
2003), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/CorpGovSummary.pdf.
130. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987).
[Vol. 58: 65
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss1/4
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
2. Risk Management Committee. Corporations should have a board committee
whose role is constantly to assess the company's various businesses' exposure
to and compliance with legal, regulatory, and other important matters.
3. Boot Camp. Corporate bylaws or governance guidelines should require
refresher courses for all directors and new directors to attend. Several graduate
schools of business, such as those at Stanford and Indiana Universities, conduct
multiple-day short courses for corporate directors.'
3'
4. Independent Director Certification. Directors should undergo a training and
testing process before they join boards. Schemes in Australia and East Asia
have initiated, or discussed initiation of, certification requirements. 3 '
5. Term Limits. Boards should enact limits of ten years or so and provide that at
least one new director be elected annually. In the "old" days, board service of
an individual lasting twenty to twenty-five years was not uncommon.
133
6. Elimination of Trophy Directors.'34 Directors and director candidates should
serve on no more than two or three additional boards. Many corporate CEOs,
long considered prime candidates for other corporations' boards of directors,
no longer serve on any others, limit themselves to one, or are limited by
contract, guideline, or bylaw to one additional directorship.'35
7. Shareholder Nomination. Some good governance checklists imply that
corporations should provide a system for shareholder nominations. In 2005,
SEC Chairman William Donaldson sought to have the Commission adopt a rule
that would mandate authorization of nominations by institutional and similar
large shareholders in cases in which a given percentage of shareholders could
"withhold authority" for proxy votes, that is, for the corporate slate of
directors.' 36 The history of that proposal is beyond the scope of this article.
8. Resignations. Bylaws and employment contracts should provide that any
resignation from a corporate office such as CFO or COO automatically
constitutes a courtesy resignation from the board seat held by the corporate
13 1. See Institute for Corporate Governance, Indiana University Kelley School of Business,
http://kelley.iu.edu/icg/psp.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2006); Stanford Graduate School of Business,
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/exed/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
132. Professionalism or Incarceration - Will Future Directors Need To Be Accredited, COMPANY
SECRETARY (Hong Kong), July 2004, at 6. In the United States, the National Association of Corporate
Directors (NACD) maintains a registry of potential directors but does not certify them. Bratton & Blair,
supra note 102, at 86 (reporting comments of Dr. Richard Raber, President and CEO, NACD).
133. See, e.g., WARD, supra note 113, at 45 (discussing the tenure of directors at General Motors).
134. See, e.g., Judith H. Dobrzynski, When Directors Play Musical Chairs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1996, § 3, at I (describing trophy directors as "well-connected types" who "can navigate corporate
America's wood-paneled board rooms as easy as their own homes.").
135. See, e.g., Anita Raghavan, More CEOs Say 'No Thanks'to Board Seats, WALL ST. J., Jan.
28, 2005, at BI (documenting the growing reluctance ofCEOs to serve on multiple boards of directors
and on corporations to allow such service).
136. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206,68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (proposing SEC Rule
14a- 11 that was later withdrawn).
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officer.137 In the WorldCom case, even after Scott Sullivan had been revealed
as the mastermind of a massive fraud and removed from his position as CFO,
he refused to resign his WorldCom board seat.
38
9. Independent Counsel The independent directors should have an attorney
present in the boardroom whose fees the corporation should pay and whose role





1. Board Chair. This position was an empty vessel into which various
corporations poured various things. The position had no legal status in
corporate statutes and remained obscure in corporate governance treatises.
40
2. Chair as Honorary Position. At many corporations, the board chair position
was, and predominately remains, ceremonial. The chair presides only over
board meetings but might also preside over shareholders' meetings; serves as
the primary liaison between directors and the corporation; controls meeting
agendas; or serves as the CEO's confidante or right-hand man. Corporate
bylaws may spell out some, but rarely all, of these varying responsibilities. At
many corporations, the CEO presides at shareholders' and even at directors'
meetings.
3. Lead Directors. Worldwide, the trend is to separate the offices of CEO and
Board Chair, rising to 95% or 100% of corporations in some countries. "4' If the
highest calling of modem boards is to evaluate and if necessary, remove senior
executives from office, particularly the CEO, critics question how a board can
perform this function if the same person who calls the meeting and sets the
137. See, e.g., Susanne Craig, How One Firm Uses Strict Governance to Fix its Troubles, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 23, 2003, at Al (discussing "E*Trade board rule ... requir[ing] directors to tender their
resignation" once they change positions within the company or leave the company permanently).
138. See Jonathan Krim & Christopher Stem, 2 Key WorldCom Witnesses Silent; Founder Ebbers,
Ex-CFO Sullivan Take Fifth Before Angry House Panel, WASH. POST., July 9, 2002, at A l (reporting
that although Sullivan was fired, he "is still on the company's board but has been asked to leave").
139. See Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: The
Emergence of the Independent Directors 'Counsel, 59 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1398-1412 (2004) (discussing
how independent directors often desire to work with independent counsel). See infra text accompanying
note 242 for a more complete discussion of Hazard and Rock's work.
140. One of the few sources is Australian: HENRY BOSCH, CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN CHAIRMEN
(1999).
141. Among the Fortune 200, non-executive chairpersons numbered 39 in 2001 and 34 in 2002,
or approximately 13%. DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, WORLDCOM, INC., Tabs
14, 15 (2004) [hereinafter BRANSON, WORLDCOM, INC.] (on file with author). The author served as the
corporate governance expert for independentdirectors and the non-executive board chairman and, in
that connection, compiled data on the Fortune 200.
[Vol. 58: 65
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss1/4
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
agenda is also the CEO. 142 The United States' partial answer has been to
appoint a senior or capable person on the board as lead director who also has
the power to convene board meetings. Although seemingly more corporations
have separated the offices than discussion reveals, the formal U.S. answer
remains appointment of a lead director.
New
1. FormalResponsibilities. Corporate bylaws or corporate governance guidelines
should detail the Board Chair's duties.
2. Minimum Responsibilities. These responsibilities would include the following:
controlling the agenda for meetings (annual, regular, and special); chairing
both shareholders' and directors' meetings; coordinating the work of board
committees; preparing board packets; coordinating board visits to company
facilities; reviewing corporate ethics programs; conducting annual reviews of
board members; and organizing the formal annual CEO review process.
Proposed
1. Mandatory Leadership Rotation. The chair position should go to a new director
at least every six years.
2. Office of Chairperson. The corporation should provide a physical office and
staff appropriate to the chairperson's position and responsibilities.
3. Annual Performance Reviews. Staff, managers, and fellow directors must
conduct annual 360-degree reviews of the Board Chair.
C. The Audit Committee
Old
1. Composition. Independent directors staffed the audit committee.'43 At least one
member, preferably more, had financial literacy-familiarity with how
financial statements are prepared and how outside accountants audit and certify
them.
142. Judith Bums, Corporate Governance Special Report: Everything You Wantedto KnowAbout
Corporate Governance... But Didn't Know to Ask, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R6 (explaining the
"top of the list" recommendation of"a panel of the Conference Board, a business-research group in New
York," as "splitting the role of chairman of the board from that of chief executive" and saying that
"[s]upporters argue that separating the roles will provide more independence and greater accountability
to shareholders.").
143. As noted earlier, the NYSE added a requirement for an audit committee to its listing
standards in 1977. Supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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2. Function. The committee was composed solely of board members and was
responsible, primarily or only, for serving the board.' The committee served
as one additional structural device assuring the integrity of the financial
information reaching the full board (upon which the board evaluated the senior
executive officers, particularly the CEO).
3. Meeting Frequency. The committee met with the corporation's outside auditors
before commencement of the annual audit to discuss the accountants' audit
plan and direct the auditors to problem areas or issues of which directors were
aware.'45 Later, the committee conducted an exit interview with the auditors,
asking for assessments of internal accounting and personnel and several
questions about the conduct of the audit.'46 Acting as a focal point for
discussion of accounting issues, the committee met one or two other times per
year.
4. Meeting Duration. Traditionally, audit committees conducted their meetings
before the full board's meeting, such as at 7:00 or 7:30 a.m. if the full board
were to convene at 9:00 a.m. 147 Accordingly, many audit committee meetings
would last between one and two hours.
New
1. Composition. SOX mandates that the audit committee be composed exclusively
of independent directors, defined so as to exclude professionals or others whose
firms derive any compensation from the corporation.
148
2. Expertise. At least one member must be a financial expert, the definition of
which is determined by the SEC. The SEC defines an expert as one who has
hands-on experience in auditing publicly-held companies. 49
144. See, e.g., Steigerwald v. A. M. Steigerwald Co., 132 N.E.2d 373,375-76 (111. App. Ct. 1955)
(holding that Illinois statutes required executive committees be composed of board members).
145. Audit committee meetings "provide the independent directors with the opportunity of asking
such questions as 'are you aware of any matters which you think the board should know and which you
think the board may not know?"' HENRY BOSCH, CONVERSATIONS WITH A NEW DIRECTOR 45 (1997)




148. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. IV 2004). The old rules and
some of the proposed new rules are described and analyzed in Helen S. Scott, The SEC, the Audit
Committee, Rules and the Marketplaces: Corporate Governance and the Future, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 549,
562-63 (2001). See also Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: An
Examination of the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 357,363 (2003)
(interpreting the Sarbanes-Oxley definition of independence to mean "absence of conflict"); Peter M.
Collins, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Creates a New Role for the Audit Committee, 228 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17,
2002, at 4 (discussing criteria for independence under Sarbanes-Oxley).
149. Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Securities Act Release No. 8138, Exchange Act Release No. 46,701, Investment Company Act Release
No. 25,775, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,208, 66,210 (Oct. 22, 2002).
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3. Meeting Frequency. Committees are to meet more often than three or four
times per year. In 2002, the year Congress enacted SOX, audit committees at
Fortune 200 corporations met an average of 7.8 times, with both a median and
a mode of 7 times.1
5 0
4. Hotline Responsibility. To comply with SOX, the audit committee should put
in place and supervise mechanisms whereby anyone in the organization can
report to and obtain the attention of those in top positions regarding financial
or accounting irregularities.'
5. Reporting Up Receptacle. In addition to serving as a hotline receptacle, the
audit committee acts as an alternative receptacle for attorney reports of
evidence of "securities law violations and similar misconduct" within the
organization.' 52 SOX section 307 provides that an attorney may make reports
to the audit committee or full board, in lieu of reports to the Chief Legal
Officer (CLO) or CEO.'53
Proposed
1. Meeting Frequency. The audit committee should meet at least eight times per
year, and more frequent meetings may be advisable.
2. Duration. One, two, or even three hour meetings are insufficient. Meetings
should last at least one-half day or longer.
3. Chair Rotation. The board should rotate the chair position on the committee at
least once every three years.
4. InterestedDirector and Officer Transactions. The committee should review the
documentation regarding interested person transactions, such as flight logs and
similar records, to police director use of the corporation's personal and real
property.
54
5. Special Meetings. At least annually, the committee should meet with interested
shareholders, securities analysts, and other observers for an accounting and
"disclosure review."
6. CFO Review. The committee should conduct an annual review of the CFO's
performance and personal finances to be able to enforce an absolute prohibition
on outside income or activities by the CFO (an Enron-Fastow provision).
150. BRANSON, WORLDCOM, INC., supra note 141, Tab 20. The related numbers for 2000 were
a mean and a median of 5 times, with a mode of 4 times. Id. at Tab 18. For 2001, a mean of 5.379, a
median of 5, and a mode of 4. Id. at Tab 19.
151. Marc I. Steinberg & Seth A. Kaufman, Minimizing Corporate Liability Exposure When the
Whistle Blows in the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 30 J. CORP. L. 445, 458 (2005).
152. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. IV 2004).
153. Id.
154. The ALl Corporate Governance Project provided that to free up board members from such
tasks, which can become mundane, the board (or shareholders) could pass a resolution that would
delegate such tasks to a corporate manager who would be free of all conceivable conflicts of interest
in the matter. ALl CORP. Gov. PROJ., supra note 97, § 1.36, at 39, § 5.09, at 315-16.
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7. Annual Training. Audit committee members should undergo an initial and then
annual refresher training course. Such a course should cover accounting
principles, auditing standards, ethical compliance, and any new
pronouncements of the Fair Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The courses should
introduce members to nomenclature and analytical tools such as WACC
(weighed average cost of capital) and EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization).
D. Accountants
Although the number ebbs and flows almost on a daily basis, there are
approximately 16,200 corporations that file periodic reports with the SEC.'55 In
2002, Big 4 firms' 5 6 audited 79% of the 16,200 corporations that file with the SEC
and 97% of corporations with revenues exceeding $250 million.157 The breakdown
is as follows: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 34%; Deloitte & Touche, 24%; Ernst &
Young, 23%; and KPMG, 18%.' Eighteen other accounting firms (the
"intermediate eighteen"), including some that are quite large, such as BDO and
Grant Thornton, also audit public companies.'59
SOX creates an independent, quasi-governmental corporation, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), with which accountants must
register if they audit one or more publicly held corporations. 6 ° Under SOX, the
PCAOB must annually audit firms that audit more than 100 clients. 6' The PCAOB
must audit other firms at least every three years.' 62 The PCAOB also issues
guidance to accountants, including Audit Standard No. 2, a voluminous guideline
concerning installation and documentation of internal controls.1
63
155. See Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information Through Improvement
of Oversight of the Auditing Process, Securities Act Release No. 8,109, Exchange Act Release No.
46,120, Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 27,543, Investment Advisors Act Release No.
2,309, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,624, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,964, 44,999 (July 5, 2002);
ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 150 n. 19 (2d ed.
2004).
156. Sometimes referred to as the "Final Four." Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers:
A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REv. 365, 368 (2004) [hereinafter Partnoy, Strict Liability].
157. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED STUDY ON
CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION 21-22 (2003); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 701 (c), 15
U.S.C. § 7201 (Supp. IV 2004)(mandating the study and ensuing report to Congress).
158. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 157.
159. See id. at 17 tbl.1.
160. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. IV 2004).
161. Id. § 104(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 7214 (Supp. IV 2004).
162. Id. § 104(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 7214 (Supp. IV 2004).
163. Allison Carpenter, PCAOB, SEC Internal Controls Guidance Focuses on Risk-Based
Integrated Reviews, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 2 1, at 921 (May 23,2005) ("Audit Standard No.
2 [(AS2) is titled] 'An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction
with An Audit of Financial Statements."'). The PCAOB has issued a number of question and answer
publications and other forms of guidance for companies and for accountants. Id.
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As of November 2004, 1,378 accounting firms had registered with PCAOB, of
which 499 are foreign-based firms."6 One reason for the high number of
registrations is that each office of a large firm registers. Thus, the Big 4 plus BDO
and Grant Thorton alone account for approximately 232 registrations.'6 5
New
1. Registration. As aforesaid, accounting firms that audit so much as one public
company must undergo screening and have a registration accepted by the
PCAOB. 1
66
2. Audits ofAuditors. The PCAOB conducts inspections of registrants.
1 67
3. Off Books Entities. SOX and the SEC require regulated corporations to make
disclosures of off balance sheet arrangements, such as those Enron employed
with its special purpose entities (SPEs).16 1 Concurrently, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has tightened the rules, requiring
financial statement disclosure on SPEs if the corporation is a "prime
beneficiary" of the arrangement, however contrived. 169 The change represents
a shift from the bright line accounting rules under which Enron operated,
requiring 3% of capital from an independent source as well as independent
governance of the entity as well. 1
70
4. Cost. In addition to paying on average $4.2 million in year-one section 404
compliance and other costs, 7' publicly held corporations must pay an annual
levy to fund the PCAOB.'72 The formula is simple. Corporations are
responsible for annual payments according to the fraction their market
capitalization bears to the market capitalization of all firmS. 17 3 The PCAOB
collects as much as $2 million annually from large public companies."'
164. George R. Goodman, Better Governance and Reporting Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Are We
There Yet?, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2074 (Nov. 22, 2004).
165. Id.
166. In this screening process, PCAOB has rejected registrations by four accounting firms. Id.
167. Id.
168. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401(a)(j), 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (Supp. IV 2004).
169. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., INTERPRETATION No. 6, CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE
INTEREST ENTITIES, at 15 (2003), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fin%2046R.pdf.
170. See Peter Behr, Hidden Numbers Crushed Enron: 'Partnerships' Shielded $600 Million
Debt, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2002, at Al ("[T]o qualify as independent partnerships outside Enron,
[SPEs] had to satisfy an accounting requirement that at least 3 percent of their capital be contributed by
outside investors.").
171. McTague, Costs Exceed Estimates, supra note 25, at 576.
172. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 109(d)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 7219 (Supp. IV 2004).
173. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 109(g), 15 U.S.C. § 7219.
174. Alison Carpenter, PCAOB Approves $103M Budget for 2004, with Focus on Inspections,
35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 2065 (Dec. 8, 2003). SOX delegates to PCAOB the power to
set funding levels and payment responsibilities. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 109, 15 U.S.C. § 7219.
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Proposed
1. Financial Statement Insurance. Corporations should obtain coverage after an
insurance company conducts its own audit, or mini audit, to determine
premium amounts.'75 The insurer should select the firm to do the audit,'76 which
eliminates the conflict of interest that arises when the company to be audited
chooses and then pays the firm to examine its financial statements.177 A
disadvantage is the high premium that corporations might have to pay, the
amount of which came to light in the Marsh & McLennan and AIG scandals.1
78
Another question is why insurance firms have not previously written such
coverage into Director and Officer (D&O) policies.
79
2. Financial Statement Reliability Indexes. Corporations would have to disclose
a numerical ranking, or the rank of the tranche in which evaluators had placed
the company's financial statements. Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and other
rating agencies which have made forays into corporate governance 8 ° might
compile such indexes. The existence of financial statement insurance might aid
these rating agencies since the index assigned might correlate closely with the
premium paid, potentially, for each $10 million in revenues.
3. Installation of Early Warning Accounting Systems. In truth, SOX, along with
Auditing Standard No. 2, already incorporates an early warning system.
"Traditional financial statement auditing begins with an auditor assessing a
company's internal control environment....""' That task gives the auditor an
early indication of the reliability of financial statements the client company has
175. See Cunningham, supra note 8, at 430 (explaining a pending proposal for insurance
companies to perform independent audits).
176. See id; see also Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and
GAAP Re-visited, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 39, 53 (2002) (arguing that the insurer should exert pressure
on the auditor to audit meticulously).
177. See Cunningham, supra note 8, at 435 ("Absence of conflict and capture risks should
heighten auditor willingness to second-guess management and not give it the benefit of the doubt.");
see also Ronen, supra note 176, at 56 (explaining that this proposal will align the auditor's interest with
the insurer's interest).
178. See Diane Brady & Marcia Vickers, AIG: What Went Wrong, Bus. WK., Apr. 11, 2005, at
32 ("Investigators believe that AIG may have goosed its financial performance with dubious
transactions and improper accounting."); Ian McDonald & Monica Langley, AIG Expected to Pay $1
Billion-Plus to Settle Probes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2006, at A4 (noting that AIG misled investors
through improper accounting).
179. Former SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest asked this question. Joseph A. Grundfest,
PunctuatedEquilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
1, 7-8 (2002) ("D&O insurers could today easily make the retention of insurer-approved auditors a
condition of coverage. They could today also require an element of control over the audit process. Yet
they don't.").
180. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
181. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, FacilitatingAuditing's New Early Warning System: Control
Disclosure, Auditor Liability, and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1449, 1450 (2004) [hereinafter
Cunningham, Facilitating New Early Warning System].
[Vol. 58: 65
28
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss1/4
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
provided.'82 By requiring auditors to undertake that process and disclose the
results to investors, SOX enables insiders and outsiders to gauge, at an early
point, the reliability of financial statements.
183
In performing the task, however, the auditor must speak out on the subject
of internal controls. By doing so, he becomes a primary, rather than secondary,
violator of securities laws. After Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. eliminated aiding and abetting liability,'84
plaintiffs encounter extreme difficulty in reaching secondary defendants,
difficulty which is absent in reaching the pockets of primary violators.'85 To
fine tune the early warning system and come closer to an "adversarial audit,"
the law should "develop safe harbor protections for forward looking auditor
statements regarding [internal] control.., that parallel existing safe harbors for
issuer statements."'86 Generally, the safe harbor for forward looking statements
provided under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act'87 does not apply
to statements auditors might make.'88 Auditors should be able to report their
findings regarding internal controls without fear of liability. 8 9
4. Choice of Auditors By Lottery. A leading piece of scholarly commentary
discussing choice of auditors contains two different proposals, with the co-
authors airing the differences between them.' 90 Both proposals address the
same problem, namely, that the corporation responsible for financial
statements, through its self-interested managers, selects and later compensates
182. See id. ("[E]nhanced transparency in the financial reporting process promises to promote the
integrity of financial statements.").
183. See PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2-AN AUDIT OF
INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 6 (2004) ("[l]nformation on internal control over financial reporting is also
intended to provide an early warning to those inside and outside the company who are in a position to
insist on improvements ....").
184. 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) ("[T]he text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid
and abet a § lOb violation.").
185. See Cunningham, Facilitating New Early Warning System, supra note 177, at 1474 ("[I]n
post-Central Bank private actions, plaintiffs would allege that auditors acted as primary violators of
section 10(b).
186. Id. at 1479.
187. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i) (2000) (providing a safe-harbor for forward-looking statements
when "accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements .... ").
188. See Cunningham, Facilitating New Early Warning System, supra note 177, at 1481
("Generally, existing safe harbors governing issuer forward-looking information do not apply to
auditors.").
189. Professor Cunningham also finds that the emphasis on internal controls only "partially
succeeds as an early warning system." Id. at 1490. SOX seems to regard internal controls as "an end
in itself' when errors of judgment, estimation, or preparation may also render financial statements
misleading. See generally id. at 1487-90 (arguing that although the early warning system is rational,
producing reliable financial statements should be the goal).
190. David B. Kahn & Gary S. Lawson, Who's theBoss?: ControllingAuditorlncentives Through
Random Selection, 53 EMORY L.J. 391, 414 (2004).
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the accounting firm that vouches for the statement's reliability.' 9' "It is as
though baseball pitchers called their own balls and strikes and then hired and
paid umpires to verify their calls."'192
Corporations could voluntarily make the relationship less cozy and more
adversarial. Indeed, they might even attempt to do so, for it would increase the
reliability of financial information and lower the cost of capital. 93 However,
the corporations would have difficulty communicating to the world that their
auditor relationship was different from other company-auditor relationships, or
in getting the public to believe them.
One way to put the requisite distance between company and auditor and
to communicate with credibility would be to select auditors by lottery. The
Kahn lottery method would require companies to select at random from a pool
of potential auditors.' 9 A public oversight board, such as the SEC or the
PCAOB, would oversee the process and fix the auditor's compensation.'95 The
thrust of the program would be "to reduce the extent to which auditors need to
worry about pleasing the management of the companies that they audit."' 96
The Lawson lottery proposal embraces a contract, rather than a regulatory
approach. " The company would "selec[t] at random from among the auditing
firms that express a willingness to accept the engagement at the specified
price. ' 98 If the posted price "does not attract a critical mass.., the company
would have to raise its offering price."'199 To the extent oversight is necessary
(for example, determining if the pool were a reasonable size) stock exchanges
or other SROs would supply it.2°°
5. Mandatory Rotation ofA uditing Firms. SOX requires that corporations rotate
the "audit partner" and the "engagement partner" assigned to the firm at least
191. See id at 392-93; see also Sean M. O'Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How
Accountants and Congress Created the Problem ofAuditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 741 (2004)
(arguing that the current system of auditor independence results in a conflict of interest for auditors).
192. Kahn & Lawson, supra note 190, at 393.
193. Id at 399.
194. Id. at 414.
195. Id.
196. Id. at415.
197. Id at 417 ("Professor Lawson does not endorse this publicly supervised lottery mechanism
because of a deeply rooted philosophical opposition to government compulsion.").
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. In the past, there have been proposals that the government should supply auditors. See, e.g.,
Mark A. Gullotta, Comment, The SEC's Auditor Independence Rule: Missing the Boat on
Independence, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 221,222 (2001) ("The government, rather than private, profit-
minded participants, should perform audits."); see also Jenkins, supra note 53 ("Auditors might be sent
to work for the SEC, which has [the] responsibility to uncover fraud."). Another proposal is that stock
exchanges assign auditors to firms. See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM 189 (2005)
("[O]ne commentator pointed out... another regulator would be much better positioned to handle this
kind of task[,] ... the stock exchanges.).
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every five years. Some original SOX proposals required a mandatory change
of auditing firms, although the proposals did not survive in the final
legislation.2 2 Nonetheless, commentators believe best practices should dictate
that firms should change auditing firms at least every five years.20 3
6. Contractual Liability Caps. In engagement agreements signed with client
corporations, accounting firms now include provisions for alternative dispute
resolution, elimination of punitive damages, and a cap on compensatory
damages the auditor may be adjudged to owe the client.2°4 Post-SOX, Big 4
accounting firms have been insistent on these types of terms.20 5 The auditors'
liability, or lack thereof, to third party investors remains unaffected since the
contract can only affect the relationship between the auditor and the client
206corporation.
7. Combinations. None of the proposals are mutually exclusive, except perhaps
for the financial statement insurance proposal. A hypothetical corporation
could purchase insurance, at least in some forms, choose its auditor by lot,
agree to liability caps, install an early warning system, disclose a financial
statement reliability index, and rotate its outside auditing firm periodically. The
cost, while not insignificant, would not be prohibitive, or would not be
prohibitive if the corporation omitted the purchase of financial statement
insurance.
8. Strict Liability or Warranty Accounting. At present, absent a contractual
provision stating otherwise, auditors may be liable to the audit client for
201. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. IV 2004). SOX also contains
a "revolving door" provision that requires a one-year minimum period before an auditor may assume
an executive position (CEO, CFO, comptroller, etc.) with a corporation whose financial statements she
has audited. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
202. See Kroger, supra note 11, at 136.
203. See, e.g., id at 135-37 (discussing the need of a mandatory auditing rotation to "eliminate
the stick that corporations hold over auditing firms."); John Plender, Don't Be Fooled By the Rotating
Audit Partner: Big Watchdogs Easily Tamed, FIN. TIMES (UK & Ireland), July 29,2002, at 12 (arguing
that audit partner rotation is no substitute for audit firm rotation). On average, Fortune 1000 firms retain
the same audit firm for 22 years. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS:
REQUIRED STUDY ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION 6 (2003).
204. See Michael Rapoport, Auditing 'Liability Caps 'Face Fire, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2005, at
C3.
205. David Reilly, Outside Audit: A Generally AcceptedAccounting Principle?-Auditor Pacts
with Companies That Prevent Suits, Limit Awards Draw Scrutiny as Disclosure Grows, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 6, 2006, at C l. Corporations have been disclosing agreements with audit firms that prevent the
audit client from suing the auditor in court, cap the amount of money damages a court may award, or
eliminate the ability of the corporation to seek punitive damages. Id. Critics contend that the agreements
morph the arm's length agreements corporations should have with auditors, which impugns auditors'
independence. Id.; see also Michael Rapoport, More Companies Are Disclosing Pacts with Auditors on
Liability Caps, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2006, at C4 ("Opponents ... say these kinds of restrictions can
compromise an auditor's performance independence .... ").
206. Douglas M. Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under the Securities Laws-Charting
the Proper Course, 65 OR. L. REV. 327, 338 (1986) (noting that accountants are generally only liable
to those with whom they are in privity, unless the specific plaintiff is foreseeable).
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malpractice.2 °7 Their liability to third parties, most particularly to investors, is
more problematic. In most jurisdictions, the accountant will be liable to those
who are "the very end and aim of' the transaction, 2 and to foreseen but not to
foreseeable parties.0 9 With the Supreme Court's elimination of aiding and
abetting under federal securities law,21 investors have had difficulty holding
accountants liable. However, as Professor Lawrence Cunningham has pointed
out, this may change as accountants attest to the efficacy of internal controls
under section 404.211 In the post-SOX era, a number of proposers seek to
change all of this, replacing the scheme with potentially more expansive
accountants' liability.
Borrowing from a concept originally advanced at the American Law
Institute (ALI) but implemented by only a few states, ALI reporter Professor
John Coffee would hold accountants strictly liable but would cap the amount
of liability at a multiple of the annual revenues the accountant derived from an
audit client.2" 2 Specifically, Professor Coffee proposes "to convert the
gatekeeper into the functional equivalent of an insurer, who would back its
auditor's certification with an insurance policy that was capped at a realistic
level." '213 Regulators would oversee the process.2"4
Harking back to a proposal made earlier, Professor Frank Partnoy espouses
a contractual system whereby accountants would agree to be strictly liable for
a percentage of the total damages.2 1 5 Partnoy's system, which would result in
greater liability and possibly lead to more bankruptcies,216 would also have the
same hallmark as Professor Coffee's proposal. That hallmark is a substitution
of strict liability for a system based upon fault. Such a system would require
proving that accountants had been negligent in performing audits, usually by
showing a failure to exert the due diligence the law requires.27
207. Id.
208. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922). Justice Cardozo coined the term. Id.
209. See Abrams Ctr. Nat'l Bank v. Farmer, Fuqua & Huff, P.C., No. 08-05-00140CV, 2005 WL
2806316, at *6 (Tex. App. Oct. 27, 2005) (unpublished decision) ("A defendant must have the specific
purpose ofproviding information to either a known plaintiffor a known group ofplaintiffs before a duty
is owed."); see also Branson, supra note 206, at 338 ("The erosion ofprivity to admit liability to third
parties in a foreseen class is the Restatement position." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552
(1976)).
210. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994).
211. See Cunningham, Facilitating New Early Warning System, supra note 177, at 1475
("Auditing Standards No. 2 may be seen to nullify Central Bank as to control audits.").
212. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 7, at 349.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 350.
215. Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability
Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 540 (2001) [hereinafter Partnoy, Barbarians].
216. See Partnoy, Strict Liability, supra note 156, at 366.
217. See Partnoy, Barbarians, supra note 215, at 540.
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9. Criminalize Accountant Negligence. Still another proposal retains liability
based upon fault but would criminalize a portion of it under "a new federal
criminal statute making [accountant misconduct] a misdemeanor, punishable
by up to one year in jail. ,2 8 The proposal's author, a former Enron prosecutor,
points out that "[e]very legal system in the world criminalizes at least some
types of negligent conduct to protect important interests in life, limb and
property. '2 9 He believes that criminalization is essential to create incentives
for auditors to take reasonable care in their conduct.
10. Fewer Criminal and Civil Proceedings. In Auditing: A Profession at Risk,220
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce calls for diversion of all or most disputes to
alternative dispute resolution and regulation of the ability to indict accounting
firms in criminal matters.22'
E. Attorneys
1. Reporting Up. The receipt of evidence of a "material violation of securities law
or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent
thereof' triggers SOX section 307.222 Upon receipt of such evidence, the
attorney must report up to either the CLO or the CEO. 223 Failing appropriate
action by the CLO or CEO, the attorney must blow the whistle to the audit
committee, the independent directors, or the full board 4.2 2 The SEC may
censure, suspend, or revoke the privilege of practice before it of any attorney
who fails to comply. 225 Much has been written about section 307, most of
which is beyond the scope of this Article.226
218. Kroger, supra note 11, at 131.
219. Id. at 130 (footnote omitted).
220. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, AUDITING: A PROFESSION AT RISK (2006), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/060 1 auditing.htm.
221. id. at 11 -13; US. Chamber Calls for Reform to Make Industry More Competitive, Viable,
38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 183 (Jan. 30, 2006); see also Reilly, supra note 205 (noting that
many audit firms are including provisions for arbitration in engagement letters they sign with audit
clients).
222. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. IV 2004).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release
No. 8,150, Exchange Act Release No. 46,868, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,829, 67 Fed.
Reg. 71670 (Dec. 2, 2002).
226. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and
Ethical Issues, 58 Bus. LAW. 143, 179-82 (2002) (supporting federal regulation of the professional
conduct of attorneys and discounting criticisms that section 307 may result in breach of confidentiality
and greater civil liability for lawyers); Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules
Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 J. CORP. L. 397, 419-22 (2004) (discounting arguments that
exempt foreign lawyers from section 307 rules will result in increased hiring of foreign lawyers); see
also Otis Bilodeau, Painter's Putsch; Richard Painter Argued for Years that Corporate Law Needed
Policing. Enron Gave Him His Opening, 25 LEGAL TIMES, at 21 (Dec. 23, 2002) (reporting Professor
Richard Painter's "campaign for tougher ethical duties" for corporate legal advisors under section 307);
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2. Past History. In SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,227 the SEC
contended that, faced with suspicious accounting irregularities, lawyers from
two prestigious law firms should have resigned and blown the whistle to the
SEC.228 Instead, the lawyers accepted the explanations the clients proffered and
took no action to delay the merger . 2 9 The court found that the lawyers had
violated the law but refused to grant the injunction the SEC requested. 30
National Student Marketing and the arguments for attorney whistleblowing
may be attributed to SEC zeal and the post-Watergate morality that pervaded
the country at the time.
A few years later, in a 2(e) Rules of Practice disciplinary proceeding, the
full Commission upheld an internal whistleblowing requirement for lawyers
who practice before the SEC. 23 1 The "lawyer must take further, more
affirmative steps," such as "[a] direct approach to the board of directors or one
or more individual directors or officers. 2 32 Although the SEC never insisted
233upon whistleblowing by attorneys, internal or otherwise, presumably apercentage of them did so in one form or another.
Proposed
1. Qualified Legal Compliance Committees (QLCCs). SOX section 307 set off a
whirlwind of lawyer criticism."' Experienced directors thought that boards and
board committees were even less likely to welcome a lawyer into the room or
Anthony Lin, Crusader Says Year-OldReform Is Working, 230 N.Y.L.J., July 31,2003, at 4 (supporting
an extension of section 307 to ban corporate lawyers from receiving contingent fees for completion of
a corporate transaction).
227. SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
228. Id. at 712.
229. Id. at 691.
230. Id. at 713-14, 717.
231. In re Carter, [ 1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,172 (Feb. 28,
1981).
232. Id.
233. In a 1982 speech, the SEC General Counsel stated that the SEC would not do so unless a
court had adjudicated that the attorney had violated the securities laws. Edward F. Greene, Lawyer
Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities and Exchange Commission, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,089, at 84,802 (Jan. 13, 1982). But see In re Gutfreund, [1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,067, at 83,608-09 (Dec. 3, 1992) (clarifying the SEC's
view that legal and compliance officers have an affirmative duty to ensure that misconduct is
addressed).
234. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal andEthicalDuties
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 736-79 (2004) (arguing that the SEC rules weaken the
reporting up requirement by allowing broad exemptions from the duty to report); see also George M.
Cohen, Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, The Defective Trigger of the SEC's Rule Implementing
SOX4 's Duty to Report, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 108 (Jan. 17, 2005) (criticizing the
standards triggering the reporting up obligation as weak and easy to circumvent); C. Evan Stewart,
Holding Lawyers Accountable in the Post-Enron Feeding Frenzy, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
38, at 1587 (Sept. 30,2002) (exploring potential SOX section 307 implementation issues including what
evidence triggers the reporting requirement and the reach of an attorney's fiduciary duties).
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make material disclosures to her knowing the lawyer has a legal duty to report
up any evidence of wrongdoing she might perceive to exist. One little-noticed
partial response has been to change the party to whom the lawyer must report.
By rule, the SEC has authorized a third method, introducing the QLCC as a
"mechanism for reporting, as well as investigating and responding to,
misconduct.
235
Board members may not perceive the QLCC as an answer. Even before
SOX, many directors and students of governance felt that law and best
practices blueprints combine to overburden board committees. Post-SOX, audit
committees face overwhelming responsibilities imposed by law. In addition,
nominating, governance, and other committees face a welter of proposed
additional responsibilities. Consequently, as a matter of best practices, many
believe that "this committee thing has gone too far." Committees and
committee responsibilities take directors away from monitoring and strategic
planning exercises, which are often regarded as directors' highest and best
uses, especially considering the part-time nature of directors' positions. The
QLCC is "yet another independent board committee. 36
Attorneys may have an opposing view, preferring creation and use of a
QLCC. Bylaw or corporate governance guideline consignment to a QLCC of
section 307 reporting up responsibilities may relieve attorneys from over-
entanglement in possible wrongdoing. Lawyers will be able to concentrate on
"process" and "transaction" engineering, which they regard as their best use.
"Attorneys, especially those at elite law firms, may refuse engagements with
issuers who do not have QLCCs 237
Despite the widespread belief that use of board committees has already
extended far beyond its usefulness, the SEC affirmatively "encourages issuers
[to create QLCCs] as a means of effective corporate governance.""23 Perhaps
blissfully unaware of the burdens it is imposing, the SEC requires one of the
QLCC's three members to also be a member of the audit committee. 9
2. Noisy Withdrawals. Newly invigorated by SOX, the SEC implemented section
307 by including within its proposed rules a provision for noisy withdrawals.
Having reported evidence of wrongdoing and determining that corporate
officials had not taken appropriate action, an attorney could insulate herself by
235. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 1, at 523 (discussing SEC Rule 205 that "sets forth minimum
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing before the Commission") (citing 17 C.F.R.
§ 205).
236. Id. at 540.
237. Id. at 550-51.
238. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release
No. 8185, Exchange Act Release No. 47,276, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,919,
[2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,823, at 87,083 (Jan. 29, 2003).
239. Id. at 87,089.
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ceasing the representation and notifying others, including the SEC, that she had
done so.2 4 0
The noisy withdrawal may be criticized as tantamount to the
whistleblowing responsibility the SEC attempted to foist upon attorneys in
National Student Marketing, at least through a back door. Due to the noise
associated with withdrawal, onlookers, including prosecutors and regulators,
would ask questions. Questions might bring wrongdoing to light. Withdrawal
then might lead to prosecution or other enforcement action.
Bending but not bowing to cries that the SEC had exceeded any authority
section 307 had bestowed upon them, the SEC did not include the noisy
withdrawal safe harbor in the final version of Rule 205.241 The Commission,
however, still keeps noisy withdrawal proposals, or narrower versions thereof,
in its desk drawer.
3. Separate Counsel for Independent Directors. Two eminent academics have
proposed that at major corporations, independent directors have their own
lawyer going forward, and on a permanent basis.242 When academics pose
structural improvements such as this, the considerable out-of-pocket cost aside,
most business persons respond that they do not wish to see lawyers as central
players in the board room. Lawyers tend to see legal issues, often with potential
liability, lurking in every nook and cranny. If an attorney acting alone tends to
be too risk averse, two attorneys in the board room would compound the
problem. In a sizeable subset of cases, attorneys would engage in one-
upsmanship, each attempting to demonstrate to the board that she has the right
stuff. Such a rivalry would obfuscate rather than clarify legal aspects of doing
business. On a more rarefied plane, at least in Delaware corporate
jurisprudence, the protection afforded to directors by the standard of care and
the business judgment rule makes it unnecessary to have a second attorney
representing independent directors in the boardroom.243
240. Attorney Conduct Proposals, Securities Act Release No. 8150, Exchange Act Release No.
46,868, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,829, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 86,802, at 86,513 (Nov. 21, 2002).
241. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, [2002-2003 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 87,070 (announcing the decision not to adopt the noisy withdrawal
provision in light of the numerous negative comments received).
242. Hazard & Rock, supra note 139, at 1395-96.
243. See E. Norman Veasey, Separate and Continuing Counsel for Independent Directors: An
Idea Whose Time Has Not Come as a General Practice, 59 BUS. LAW. 1413, 1413-14 (2004). Former
Delaware Chief Justice Veasey identifies the following six situations in which corporate provision of
separate counsel would be appropriate:
(i) an independent committee, such as the audit or compensation committee, has
a tradition of having its own regular, outside counsel...; (ii) the general counsel
has a real or perceived conflict; (iii) the board or committee believes that it needs
to explore independently something that appears questionable; (iv) a special
investigation; (v) the need for a particular legal expertise; or (vi) simply-to
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F. Nominating, or Governance, Committee
Old
The primary purpose of a nominating committee was to take the process of
developing board candidates out of the CEO's hands where the power had
traditionally been lodged.244 The committee would thus reinforce board
independence. Creation of the nominating committee also had the corollary purpose
of encouraging board diversity, that is, addition to the board of persons of color,
women, and others historically on the board.
2 45
Even after the use of nominating committee had become widespread, certain
CEOs continued to subvert committees and their work. For example, CEOs Dwayne
Andreas at Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) and Bernie Ebbers at WorldCom
insisted upon CEO nominating committee membership.246 In Decatur, Illinois,
according to wags, ADM referred to the board of directors as "All Dwayne's
Men. 2 47 During the 1980s and 1990s, at a number of major corporations (American
Express, Sunbeam, Scott Paper, Archer Daniels Midland, Morrison Knudsen),
CEOs were able to co-opt or end run nominating committees, allowing them to
remold or reshape boards of directors themselves, thus postponing a comeuppance
for CEO under-performance or wrongdoing.2 48 A properly functioning governance
and nominating committee would have prevented illicit board molding.
New
1. Nominations. The committee, not the CEO, should be responsible for
committee as well as board nominations.
2. Rotation of Committee Chairs. Rotation should be mandatory. The nominating
committee implements and enforces the provision.
3. BoardLeadership. The Committee, not the CEO, should identify and nominate
persons for the board chair position.
244. ALl CORP. Gov. PROJ., supra note 97, § 3A.04 cmt., at 122-23.
245. WARD, supra note 112, at 226-27; see also DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE:
How CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM (forthcoming Dec.
2006).
246. See Jared Sandberg & Joann S. Lublin, Questioning the Books: WorldCom 's Travails Could
Affect Its Directors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1995, at B 1.
247. See Joann S. Lublin, Management: Is ADM's Board Too Big, Cozy, and Well-Paid?, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 17, 1995, at BI ("The nominating committee, for instance, consists of M. Andreas, the
Chairman and the CEO; his son .. .; [a] retired [c]hairman .. .[and] the father of the company
treasurer.").
248. WARD, supra note 113, at 115 ("[T]he general issue of overpaid executives, and the more
specific concern of pay that did not match results, were both symptoms of a larger problem-boards that
were in bed with management.").
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4. Committee Charters. The nominating, or governance, committee should
oversee the adoption and the periodic updating of charters, which all board
committees must have.
5. Organic Corporate Documents. The committee should recommend and oversee
the process of amending the articles of incorporation and bylaws.
Proposed
1. Independence. The committee should define director independence and
monitor the same on an ongoing basis.249
2. Separation of Offices. The committee should pull the laboring oar on the
periodic discussion of separate offices for chair and CEO and on the
appointment of a lead director if the same individual remains both chairperson
and CEO. °
3. Executive Sessions of the Board. Again, the enforcer should be the nominating,
or governance, committee."
4. Risk Management Functions. These functions should be assigned to a separate
risk management committee on some corporate boards. The committee should
perform two tasks:
a) "Develop and monitor law compliance systems;"
b) "Develop and ensure compliance with a sound business ethics
code.252
5. Schedules, meetings, and workloads. The committee should periodically
evaluate board schedules, quality of board meetings, and workloads of
committees and individual directors.253
6. Disclosure Documents. The committee should "[e]nsure director responsibility
for disclosure documents," or portions of them.254
7. Conflicts of Interest. The committee should have the responsibility to call
attention to and deal with interested directors, corporate opportunity, and other
duty of loyalty issues. 5
8. Insider Trading. The committee should have a similar responsibility with
regard to insider trading issues as it has to conflicts of interest.
25 6
9. Succession Planning. The committee should have plans in effect for the CEO,
members of the board, and key corporate officers.257
249. Veasey, supra note 243, at 1416. Chief Justice Veasey would assign sixteen discrete
responsibilities to the nominating, or governance, committee, including those discussed in this text. Id.
at 1416-17.
250. Id. at 1416.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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10. Evaluations. The committee should maintain and otherwise be in charge of the
evaluation process for directors, the board, and board committees.258
11. Shareholder Relations. The committee should be charged with oversight of
effective shareholder relations and communications.259
12. Electronic Town Meetings. The committee should establish and maintain a
website on which any 1% shareholder would be entitled to post ideas and
resolutions without the type of screening corporations currently undertake with
shareholder public interest proxy proposals.
260
13. Disclosure Committee. The governance committee should set up a disclosure
committee composed of directors, members of senior management, and outside
advisers, who might include a securities analysts. 6
14. Shareholder Proxy Statement Proposals. The committee should oversee the
reimbursement of shareholders for proposals they make, which by SEC rule
corporations must include in the corporation's own annual proxy statement.
262
Shareholder activists are advancing the reimbursement proposal, which is itself




This committee, comprised of independent directors, while becoming
commonplace in corporations, 26 generally has been conceded to be a failure. CEO
compensation has run rampant in the United States. In 1990, Graef Crystal
estimated CEO compensation to be 16 times that of the average worker in Japan,
21 times in Germany, and 160 times in the United States.2 65 By 2000, Crystal put
the number "north of 400 times and heading rapidly to 500 times. 266 For several
reasons, the committee has not checked this rapid rise of compensation or otherwise
worked well.
One reason for the committee's failure to check the rapid rise in compensation
is the committee's hiring of compensation consultants, either because of advice
from lawyers or because they are seeking the safe harbor protection of the business
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See generally Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2006) (addressing "when a
company must include a shareholder's proposal in its proxy statement .....
261. See Veasey, supra note 243, at 1417.
262. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2006).
263. See Mark Maremont & Erin White, Stock Activism's Latest Weapon, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4,
2006, at C5.
264. See ALI CORP. Gov. PROJ., supra note 97, § 3A.05, at 127-28.
265. GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN
EXECUTIVES 205, 207, 209 (1991).
266. Kathleen Day, Soldiers for the Shareholder, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2000, at H5 (reporting
remarks of Graef Crystal).
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judgment rule.267 Consultants use a quartile method of comparison. Even though the
quartile method of comparison systems have had their obvious inadequacies
highlighted,268 compensation committees and consultants continue to use them.
Because almost all companies want their top executives' compensation to be in the
highest quartile, the result is an upward pressure on compensation.269
CEOs have also come to know how to game the system. They tend to appoint
the newest and likely most insecure director to the committee. CEOs then appoint
a director who also is a sitting or former CEO who has a vicarious interest, at least,
in ever higher levels of CEO compensation.27 °
Nonetheless, most corporate governance schematics continue to include a
compensation committee of outside directors as a central element.
New and Proposed
1. Review Meetings. The compensation committee charter should provide for
semi-annual committee meetings with the director of human resources and the
general counsel of the corporation to review related party transactions, human
resources compensation levels, and complaints or disputes over benefits or
other compensation levels.
2. Annual StaffReview. The compensation committee oversees the annual review
of the human resources director.
3. Public Disclosure. Agog at the sums CEOs receive, in January, 2006, the SEC
rolled out proposed regulations that would treble the disclosures public
corporations must make about senior executives' pay.27' In a new
"Compensation Discussion and Analysis" (CD&A) section in every proxy
statement, annual report, and registration statement, corporations will have to
narrate how the board of directors sets pay levels, disclose the long-term value
of stock options and the value of executive perquisites, and quantify severance
267. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, No. 411, 2006 WL 2056651, at *3
(Del. June 8, 2006) ("To assist in the financial terms of the OEA, Russell recruited Graef Crystal, an
executive compensation consultant, and Raymond Watson, a member of Disney's compensation
committee and a past Disney board chairman who had helped structure Wells' and Eisner's
compensation packages.").
268. See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR THE CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST
FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs 193 (2002) (noting that "external compensation consultants (which were
generally chosen by the CEO candidate himself) entered the picture and introduced the false yardstick
of the compensation packages of other CEOs," which has been further undermined by recent evidence
demonstrating how loosely connected CEO compensation is to shareholder wealth).
269. Joann S. Lublin, The Great Divide: CEO Pay Keeps Soaring Leaving Everybody Else
Further Behind, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1996, at RI.
270. See WARD, supra note 113, at 219 ("If two CEOs serve on the compensation committees of
each other's board, the temptation is to subtly help 'one hand wash the other.').
271. 17 C.F.R § § 229.402, .407 (2006); see Joann S. Lublin & Kara Scannell, They Say Jump:
SEC Plans Tougher Pay Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at Cl; Rachel McTague, SEC Votes
Unanimously to Adopt Rules Updating Executive Compensation Disclosure, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 21, at 1310 (July 31, 2006).
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and retirement pay to be received under existing provisions. 72 Filed documents
will contain up to six tables containing information regarding executive
compensation. 73 CEOs and CFOs both must certify the CD&A much like they
certify financial statements under section 302.274 The SEC regulations are part
of the growing dissatisfaction in the United States about the inordinate growth
and high levels of CEO pay.275 When the SEC adopted the regulation, it added
a new layer of responsibility for compensation committees members.
4. Overcompensation. The SEC and public companies have also faced another
emerging scandal involving how corporations over-compensate executives, that
of "backdating" and "spring loading" stock option grants to increase
executives' option exercise profits.276
H. Risk Management Committee
Proposed
Risk management is one of the newer ideas prevalent in certain corporate
governance circles.277 The committee's mission is to identify major risks in the
corporation's businesses operations. The committee reviews the corporation's
responses to manage and minimize those risks.
The committee should review risk disclosures or reports and employ experts,
as necessary, to understand and clarify risk disclosures in documents the company
files.
Modem corporate governance schematics now call for as many as six
committees of the board of directors: audit, nominating and governance,
compensation, legal compliance (QLCC), disclosure, and risk management. In
addition, individual corporations may retain one or two first generation board
committees, such as finance or capital expenditure, bringing the total to eight or
more committees.
272. McTague, supra note 271, at 1310.
273. Id.
274. Id ("The CD&A will be 'filed,' meaning it must be certified by the [CEO] and [CFO]....").
275. See LUCIEN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 67-68 (2004); Jesse Eisinger, Memo to Activists: Mind CEO
Pay, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at Cl.
276. "Spring loading" is the practice of granting additional options to executives shortly before
the corporation announces bullish (favorable) developments. Kara Scannell, Can Companies Issue
Options, Then Good News?, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2006, at A1; see also Gretchen Morgenson, At the
Options Buffet: Some Got a Bigger Helping, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2006, at I (discussing companies
facing criminal charges for backdating); Floyd Norris, Options Brought Riches andNow Big Troubles,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2006, at C I (reporting criminal charges against CEO of Brocade Communication
Systems for abuse of executive options).
277. See, e.g., News Digest: Risk Management, J. ACCOUNTANCY, October 2003, at 20
(announcing that the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission released
a draft framework "which defines and describes enterprise risk management and provides a standard"
for public and private entities).
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L The Ethics Officer and the Code of Ethics
Proposed
1. The Ethics Office. The board of directors should establish a formal ethics office
that would function under the supervision of the CEO and CLO but would
provide the board with regular written reports and briefings and undergo
periodic program reviews by the board.278
2. Ethics Pledge. In addition to overseeing signatures by employees on the code
of conduct, the ethics office should ensure that all new employees as well as
existing staff swear to and sign an ethics pledge.
3. Annual Reviews. The full board of directors should meet with the CLO to
review the resources and leadership of the ethics office; the adequacy of ethics
and ethics compliance programs; and the contingent legal risks the corporation
may face due to ethical failures.
4. Ethics Director. This person should have a substantial level of legal
experience, ideally including direct regulatory or law enforcement experience.
5. Diversity. Through the ethics office and human resources department, the board
of directors should undertake a wide-ranging review of the corporation's
diversity practices.
J. Compliance Officer
The SEC Commissioner suggested that corporations should recruit an upper-
level management corporate officer whose task is to ensure the corporation's
compliance with regulatory and legal requirements.279 Presumably, such an officer
would perform much of the day-to-day work of the risk management committee in
corporations where one exists.
K. Whistleblowers
Old and New
SOX adds an umbrella whistleblower provision to an existing patchwork of
other federal protection provisions. 280 The SOX provision creates a new cause of
action for those who suffer adverse employment actions as a result of reporting
278. See Rachel McTague, Glassman Says Firms Need Officer to Handle Corporate
Responsibility, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1626 (Oct. 7, 2002).
279. SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman has been a proponent. See id. (reporting a speech by
Commissioner Glassman to the American Society of Corporate Secretaries).
280. These other federal protections include, for example, provisions in the Toxic Substance
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a) (2000); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000); and Energy
Reorganization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) (2000).
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corporate fraud.28' The provision is broad, covering subcontractors' and other
employees' actions as well as those of direct employers.282 The complainant must
283file with OSHA within ninety days of the occurrence. After an investigation,
written findings, and a hearing before an administrative law judge, OSHA may
award damages making the employee "whole,, 284 which may include litigation
costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorneys' fees.285
Proposed
1. Private Inspector General Position. Then SEC Enforcement Director Stephen
Cutler has "urged companies to appoint a permanent ombudsman or business
practices officer to receive and investigate complaints. 286
2. Formal Intake Process. The corporation should ensure that a process exists to
provide the employee with reasonable assurance of confidentiality. The
employee should not have to notify anyone in her "chain of command" over
her287 and may, under certain schematics, blow the whistle to a third-party
subcontractor interposed precisely for purposes of preserving anonymity.28 8
3. Publicized Corporate Policy. The corporation should post notices, send letters,
and otherwise inform employees of their whistleblowing apparatus, including
the intake procedure and provisions for employee anonymity.
289
4. Educational Programs. Corporations should assure that training exists in
contractor and subcontractor organizations because, even though these entities
may not be publicly held, the SOX whistleblower protections apply if the entity
281. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514 (Supp. IV 2004); see also Steinberg
& Kaufman, supra note 151, at 448 (noting that SOX forbids discriminatory actions toward employees
who report violations). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit gave employers some reliefwhen
it affirmed Department of Labor and District Court conclusions that the whistleblowing provisions have
no extraterritorial application, rejecting the claim of an employee of an Argentine subsidiary. Camero
v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2006).
282. Steinberg & Kaufman, supra note 151, at 447-48.
283. Id. at 449.
284. Id at 448.
285. See, e.g., Welch, USDOL/OALJ Rep. No. 2003-SOX-000 15 (Dep't of Labor Jan. 28,2004),
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLICIWHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ALJDECISIONS/
SOX/0350x I 5c.htm (A.L.J. final admin. review) (recommending remedies of reinstatement, back pay,
and award of costs to former CFO).
286. Cutler Calls For Corporate Ombudsman to Enhance Whistleblower Provision, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) No. 2156, at 4-5 (Dec. 29, 2004).
287. Mark R. Attwood, When the Whistle Blows: Renewed Enthusiasm Among Employee
Watchdogs, in ADVANCED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WORKSHOP 2003, at 1113, 1130 (Practising Law
Institute 2003).
288. William R. McLucas & Mark M. Oh, Whistleblowing: Protection of Corporate Officials and
Employees Who Provide Evidence of Fraud Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 2004, at 61, 71 (Practicing Law Institute 2004).
289. See Steinberg & Kaufman, supra note 151, at 460.
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renders services for the publicly held corporation.29 ° At the end of training, the
company should retain SOX acknowledgment certificates stating that
employees understand the policy and agree to abide by it.29'
5. Documentation. Employers should create a document gathering and retention
system so that if the need arises, the company possesses evidence tending to
show, or actually showing, that supervisors took adverse employment for
reasons other than possible knowledge of whistleblowing activities.292
L. Other
1. Prescreening Candidates for Officer Positions. Bank regulators have long
vetted officers proposed by a bank's board of directors, insisting on experience
in the financial field and other qualifications.293 Regulators of public
corporations should do the same.2 94
2. Reimbursement of Shareholder Proxy Proposal Expenses. The SEC has
insisted that Bank of New York and American Express, among others, include
shareholder bylaw amendment proposals that would effect such
reimbursements in their annual proxy statements.295
III. WHAT HAVE WE WROUGHT?
Each corporate governance expert and corporation can best answer the question
of whether the corporate governance pendulum has swung too far and whether the
addition of the devices reviewed, and others as well, are valuable adjuncts or just
bells and whistles. Only a corporate official, with proximity to installation of
various charters, committees, codes, software, and SOX devices and processes, can
estimate the costs. Nonetheless, from an examination of the events and
recommendations of recent years, a number of intangible costs have not been, but
should be, articulated:
290. Further, criminal penalties apply both to public and private companies. See Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 § 1107, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. IV 2004); Steinberg & Kaufman, supra note 151, at 448.
291. Cf Victoria Donati, Whistleblowers and Other Retaliation Claims, in 2 32ND ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 989, 1019-23 (Practising Law Institute 2003) (describing training
practices to improve employee knowledge of complaint policies).
292. Id. at 1022; Steinberg & Kaufman, supra note 151, at 462.
293. James Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public Company Management: Lessons from Bank
Regulation (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Paper No. 49,2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=873667.
294. See id. (proposing that the SEC appoint monitors for some large public firms who will fulfill
roles similar to large bank examiners).
295. Proposals to Reimburse Shareholders for Election Expenses Not Excludable, 38 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 502 (Mar. 20, 2006). Reimbursement proposals form the tip of the iceberg,
the iceberg being the advancement of shareholder proposals as bylaw amendments which, if adopted,
would be binding rather than advisory. See Mark Maremont & Erin White, Stock Activism 's Latest
Weapon, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2006, at C 1.
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1. More Is Not Necessarily Better. If four meetings a year had been adequate, and
some corporations held six, eight meetings per year is the new standard and ten
is even better. If meetings lasted an hour or an hour and a half in the "bad old
days," meetings now should go on for three, four, or five hours. More is better.
For anyone who has attended a number of meetings in her lifetime, she
knows that after an hour and a half or two hours, meetings encounter rapidly
diminishing returns.296 Attendees begin to doodle excessively and toss their
pencils in the air. One famous management guru shuns meetings as much as he
is able.297 More-more meetings, longer meetings, more committees-is not
better governance. Someone, preferably someone in authority, should bang this
drum and bang it loudly. In corporate governance, things have gotten out of
hand.
2. The Role of Board Committees, Particularly Audit Committees. Again, as
originally conceived, the board constituted committees from among their own
number.298 The sole original purpose of committees was to aid the board in its
work. For example, the audit committee was an additional check, additional to
the outside auditor and to such internal controls as existed, on the integrity of
financial statements and similar information that would ultimately reach the
full board. The full board would then use the information to evaluate the
corporation's senior executives. SOX, preceded by the NYSE and others'
public statements, has changed all of this. Audit committees now have
responsibilities directly to shareholders and the investing public.2 99 Under SOX,
an audit committee now has a stand- alone existence.' The committee, not the
board, hires the outside auditor and receives reports.3"' The committee has the
freedom to hire attorneys, accountants, and consultants." 2 This role for the
audit committee is a sea change in the makeup and use of board committees,
but it is change that has received little notice, or has been taken for granted.
3. Change in the Role of the Board. Similar to its effect on audit committees and
with little fanfare, SOX and the good governance movement have changed the
board's role, bringing it perhaps full circle back to what it was in the 1940s and
1950s. Back then, statutes affirmatively provided that it was the board of
directors upon which the law bestowed responsibility for management of the
296. See SIMON RAMO, MEETINGS, MEETINGS, AND MORE MEETINGS: GETTING THINGS DONE
WHEN PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED 107-09 (2005) (discussing the tendency of people to fall asleep during
meetings).
297. Warren Buffett, the most celebrated investor of our time and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway,
"steers clear of meetings and advisers." Susan Pulliam & Karen Richardson, Warren Buffett,
Unplugged, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2005, at Al.
298. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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corporation's business and affairs.3"3 In many corporations, large and not so
large, directors do not manage. Instead, they oversee and provide strategic
direction to management of the corporation by others.3"4 Acceding to the reality
of this situation, in the late 1970s and early 1980s statutes began to provide that
"[a]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the
business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its
board of directors . *. .. , The drafters adopted a less imperative tone,
enhanced by use of the passive voice, in contradistinction to older statutory
commands to boards that "Thou shalt manage."
The ALI Corporate Governance Project continued the trend. The Corporate
Governance Project provided that "[t]he management of the business of a
publicly held corporation.., should be conducted by or under the supervision
of such principal senior executives . . . as are designated by the board of
directors ... "306 In turn, the highest calling and primary mission of the board
became to "[s]elect, regularly evaluate, fix the compensation of, and, where
appropriate, replace the.., senior executives."30 7 In the 1990s, many corporate
boards adapted to this new, more focused role for boards of directors,
monitoring the performance of, and often replacing, CEOs.
In the early 1980s, when the ALI Reporters introduced this concept, it was
quite controversial. Corporate house counsel, who began to attend the ALI
annual meetings in droves, were indignant, questioning the standing of a law
reform organization to tell directors whether or not they could manage.30 8 The
ALI sought to address their concerns, affirmatively providing that a board has
power, at its option, to engage in management-type functions.30 9
Prior to Enron and WorldCom, at least in corporate governance circles, the
monitoring model had become an accepted description of a board's proper role.
Now, post-Enron and post-WorldCom, regulators, investors, and journalists
raise the hue and cry: "Where were the directors? Why weren't they
303. See ALl CORP. Gov. PROJ., supra note 97, § 3.01 cmt., at 82 ("The formulation... differs
from the literal terms of the older statutory formulations (which commonly provided that the business
of a corporation 'shall be managed by [its] board')."); see, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.310 (West 2000)
("The property and business shall be controlled and managed by a board of directors").
304. Am. Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW.
1591, at 1603, 1621 (1978), states:
It is generally recognized that the board of directors is not expected to
operate the business. Even under statutes... it is recognized that actual operation
is a function of management. The responsibility of the board is limited to
overseeing such operation.
It is important to [emphasize] that the role of the director is to monitor ....
305. REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (b) (1984).
306. ALI CORP. Gov. PROJ., supra note 97, § 3.01.
307. Id. § 3.02(a)(1).
308. The author is an elected member of the ALl and attended annual meetings from 1981 to
1994, save the 1991 San Francisco meeting.
309. ALI CORP. Gov. PROJ., supra note 97, § 3.02(b).
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managing?" The answer is that, under the prevailing model, they were not
supposed to be.
Boards must manage now. The present view seems to put boards of
directors back into the positions they held in 1955, with little cognizance of the
winds of change and trends in the intervening years. It is a separate question
whether a board comprised of part-time overseers can actually manage or
actively oversee the management of large complex enterprises, or whether the
device has reached or gone past its inherent limitations."' Reflecting doubts
about a board's ability to manage, SOX and other modem reforms place much
of their emphasis on strengthening gatekeepers other than independent
directors. The point here, however, is that another change has taken place with
little awareness of where we have been or of where we might be going.
4. Monitors andlnspectors. Under English Company law, regulators may appoint
an inspector who delves deeply into the affairs of public companies that have
gone awry.3 1' The inspector then publishes a book-length work that divines
what may have gone wrong. In commonwealth countries, company law may
provide for a Royal Commission, a distinguished body headed by a judge on
leave from the bench.3"2 After its investigation, the Royal Commission reports
its findings, often in a multi-volume work. In Australia, for example, a Royal
Commission has reported back on what went wrong at HIH Insurance,
Australia's largest corporate collapse." 3
In the United States, unlike the United Kingdom and elsewhere, short of
bankruptcy, no statutory authority exists for such a mechanism. In bankruptcy,
courts often appoint examiners who hire fancy law firms (often their own), and
then render not one but two or three expensive and lengthy reports.314
Lack of statutory authority has not stopped U.S. courts. Federal district
judges have appointed "corporate monitors" who go inside of troubled
companies for months at a time. They then render lengthy and expensive
reports. For example, judges have appointed monitors to review and report on
corporate governance at Hollinger International and WorldCom (later known
as MCI), among others.3 15
310. The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Largely Publicly Owned
Corporation, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2094 (1978) ("It is plainly impossible for a board composed partly
of 'outsiders,' that is partly of persons who are not full time employees, to conduct... day-to-day
[corporate] affairs.").
311. See Companies Act, 1985, 33 & 34 Eliz. 2, c.6 § 432.
312. See, e.g., Royal Commissions Act, 1902-1973 §§ 1-16 (Austrl.) (establishing Australia's
use of a Royal Commission to regulate companies).
313. See MARK WESTFIELD, THE INSIDE STORY OF AUSTRALIA'S BIGGEST CORPORATE COLLAPSE
239-40 (2003); Michael Adams, Professor, Univ. of Tech., Sydney, Australia Corporate Governance:
Lessons from HIH Insurance, Presented at the Australia Law Teachers Ass'n. Conference at Waikato
University, Hamilton, New Zealand (July 8, 2005) (on file with author).
314. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
315. See Joann S. Lublin & Shawn Young, Even as MCI Makes Strides, Monitor Stays, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 20, 2004, at B I (reporting that former SEC Chairperson Richard Breeden, alone and via his
consulting firm, billed $2.3 million at $800 per hour, over twenty-one months, and showed no sign of
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Perhaps the next bell (or whistle) may be a proposal to statutorily authorize
this new breed of outside corporate cop.31 6 Certainly, many corporate monitors
and legal academics do not subscribe to the proposition that "more is not
necessarily better." They not only tend to hold the opposite view, but would be
willing to write law review articles, give congressional testimony, and do
whatever else it takes to advocate a governance scheme in which the
presumption is more is better.
IV. CONCLUSION
The time has come for a retrenchment from Sarbanes-Oxley. This Article
attempts to demonstrate not only one of the costs SOX poses, but also the welter of
proposals, services, and software coming from all directions at publicly held
corporations, in this new $35 billion per year industry. That marketing onslaught
alone is reason for retrenchment.
The legislation's most outspoken sponsor, Representative Michael Oxley, has
taken the position that "it is unlikely that Congress will revisit it.'"317 By contrast,
the SEC's Advisory Committee on Small Companies has taken a refreshing and
proactive stance, which four out of five SEC Commissioners has rejected," 8
recommending elimination of section 404 attestation procedures for smaller
corporations, among other things.319 Perhaps the SEC Advisory Committee or the
American Bar Association, or both, could take the lead, sending the message that
more is not necessarily better. So far, however, "[t]he Sarbanes-[Oxley] Act is a lot
like the weather: Everyone talks about it, but no one does anything about it.
'32°
Other countries have concluded that even among public companies, tiers of
disclosure and other requirements may be more appropriate than "one-size-fits-
leaving).
316. See, e.g., Fanto, supra note 293 (proposing that the SEC appoint monitors for some large
public firms who will fulfill roles similar to large bank examiners).
317. Barney Tumey, Congress Unlikely to Revisit Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Help Small Companies,
37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1781 (Oct. 17, 2005) (reporting on Oxley's speech at the law
firm of McKenna, Long & Aldridge, in Atlanta, GA). One debate is whether administratively the SEC
can offer significant relief. See, e.g., Rachel McTague & Richard Hill, Oxley, Baker Tell SEC Agency
Has Power to Mitigate SOXProblems, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 449 (Mar. 13, 2006)
(discussing attorney Damon Silver's argument that the SEC has no such power).
318. See Scannell & Reilly, supra note 31, at C 1; Steven Marcy, SEC Promises More Section 404
Guidance but Rejects Exemption for Small Companies, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 901
(May 22, 2006).
319. Rachel McTague, Panel Seeks to End Auditor Attestation Under SOX § 404 for Micros,
Small Caps, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1825 (Oct. 31, 2005).
320. Harvey Pitt, Make SOX Fit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2006, at A12. Mr. Pitt is a former
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all."32' The United States should evolve and authoritative bodies should advocate
a two or even three-tiered system not only of disclosure but also of SOX. Such a
system would constitute the rootstalk for a generation of renewed entrepreneurship
and capital formation in the United States.
321. See, e.g., Karen Howlett, Regulators Propose Two-Tiered Disclosure, GLOBE AND MAIL
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